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CONSENT VERSUS CLOSURE
Howard M. Erichsont & Benjamin C. Zipurskytt
The dfficulty of resolving mass tort cases has frustrated claimants, de-
fendants, courts, and counsel alike. Defendants demand closure, but class
certification has proved elusive, and nonclass settlements require individual
consent. Lawyers and scholars have been drawn to strategies that solve the
problem of mass tort cases by empowering plaintiffs' counsel to negotiate
package deals that effectively sidestep individual consent. In the massive
Vioxx settlement, the parties achieved closure by including terms that made it
unrealistic for any claimant to decline. The American Law Institute's Prin-
ciples of the Law of Aggregate Litigation offers another solution: it pro-
poses to permit clients to consent in advance to be bound by a settlement with
a supermajority vote. This Article argues that, despite their appeal, both of
these strategies are deficient. Lawyer-empowerment strategies like these render
settlements illegitimate when they rely on inauthentic consent or place lawyers
in the untenable position of allocating funds among bound clients. Consent,
not closure, is the touchstone of legitimacy in mass tort settlements.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2007, representatives of the pharmaceutical
company Merck signed a $4.85 billion agreement with law firms that
represented individuals suing Merck for heart attacks and strokes al-
legedly caused by Merck's blockbuster painkiller, Vioxx.i Despite the
headlines proclaiming the settlement 2-not to mention the fact that
the document was titled "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT"-the No-
vember 2007 deal could not have been a settlement of claims. That
deal was struck between Merck and law firms, not between Merck and
the plaintiffs. The law firms did not have claims against Merck; their
clients did.
How could Merck know that its deal with the law firms would
result in an actual settlement of the plaintiffs' claims? The deal con-
tained two controversial terms that made it practically impossible for a
claimant to decline the offer. First, under the terms of the agreement,
for a lawyer to participate in the deal-that is, for any of the lawyer's
clients to avail themselves of the settlement offer-the lawyer was re-
quired to recommend the settlement to all of the lawyer's eligible cli-
ents. Second, if any clients decided not to participate in the
settlement, the lawyer was required to withdraw from representing the
nonsettling clients. A client wishing to decline the settlement, in
other words, faced the prospect of losing her lawyer and finding that
every other lawyer handling Vioxx claims was similarly unavailable.
Under these circumstances, Merck had every reason to believe that its
deal with law firms would succeed in bringing about a settlement of
claims. And it did. One year later, the Claims Administrator reported
that over 99.79% of the eligible claimants had enrolled.3
I See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on
the Signature Pages Hereto (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement Agreement],
available at www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement-Agreement.pdf.
2 E.g., Alex Berenson, Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10,
2007, at Al; Carrie Johnson, Merck Agrees to Blanket Settlement on Vioxx, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
2007, at D1; Heather Won Tesoriero et al., Merck's Tactics Largely Vindicated as It Reaches Big
Vioxx Settlement, WALL ST.]., Nov. 10, 2007, at Al; Wailin Wong, Settlement Frees Merck of Vioxx
Suits, CHI. TIB., Nov. 10, 2007.
3 BROWNGREER PLC, CLAIMs ADMINISTRATOR CouRT REPORT No. 13, at 2 (Dec. 19,
2008), available at www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mdlreport_1219
08.pdf. By September 16, 2009, 48,507 claims had been submitted, including 30,480 claims
for myocardial infarctions and 18,027 claims for ischemic strokes. BROWNGREER PLC,
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Are lawyers allowed to do that? May a litigator sign a contract
with her client's adversary promising to recommend the adversary's
settlement offer and drop any client who says no? The lawyers who
negotiated the deal found ways to hedge the language of the settle-
ment agreement in gentler and more qualified terms, but on nearly
anyone's reading, the settlement agreement pushed the envelope in
legal ethics.
Yet, the settlement of the Vioxx litigation represented, in many
ways, a highly satisfactory resolution of the dispute. One can under-
stand why the parties struck the deal and why all sides seemed rather
pleased with it. From Merck's perspective, a settlement of under $5
billion seemed a reasonable price to pay; financial analysts initially
predicted that Merck's liability could run as high as $25 billion.4 The
settlement removed the distraction and expense of massive litigation
and allowed the company to get back to business. For the tens of
thousands of claimants whose heart attacks and strokes Vioxx may
have caused, the settlement provided substantial compensation and a
measure of satisfaction. Plaintiffs had faced a vigorous defense and
had seen only mixed success. From the perspective of plaintiffs and
their lawyers, a settlement of nearly $5 billion seemed a pretty good
payday. For the courts (and the taxpayers who pay for them), the
settlement removed a potentially enormous drain on judicial re-
sources. Measured by the closure it brought, the deal might be called
one of the great success stories of mass tort resolution.
Achieving closure in mass tort settlements has not been easy. The
standard answer for creating binding resolutions of mass disputes-
the class action-rarely succeeds in mass torts. At least in mass torts
involving personal-injury or wrongful-death claims, individual issues
and intraclass conflicts render such classes uncertifiable. Ever since
the Supreme Court rejected a pair of asbestos settlement class actions
in the late 1990s,5 and particularly since the fen-phen settlement class
action a few years later resulted in a disastrous ballooning of costs for
the defendant,6 mass tort lawyers largely abandoned any hope that
settlement class actions would be the key to finding closure.
Nonclass aggregate settlements have filled this void, but in this
setting, closure collides with consent. Outside of class actions and
bankruptcy cases, a settlement binds only those claimants who choose
to accept the deal. If too many claimants decide not to participate,
CLAIMs ADMINISTRATOR COURT REPORT No. 21, at 4 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at www.brown
greer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mdlreport_091709.pdf.
4 Alex Berenson, Merck Is Said to Agree to Pay $4.85 Billion for Vioxx Clain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2007, at Al.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 15-21.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 22-32.
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the defendant faces substantial ongoing liability exposure and litiga-
tion expenses. Defendants worry that the claimants with the most seri-
ous claims may be the least inclined to settle. The last thing a
defendant wants to do is put serious money on the table only to find
that the settlement eliminated junk claims while leaving high-value
plaintiffs in the litigation pipeline. Aggregate settlements can and
often do resolve large bundles of mass tort claims, but when numer-
ous law firms each represent numerous plaintiffs, true closure is hard
to find. Yet, closure is what defendants demand, and it is what plain-
tiffs need to offer if they are to maximize settlement value.
The Vioxx Settlement Agreement stands as the most prominent
real-life solution to the intractable problem of achieving closure in a
mass tort settlement without using the class action rule and without
resorting to bankruptcy. It is also the most striking single illustration
of what has become the standard answer to the mass tort closure prob-
lem-lawyer empowerment. Class action settlements, of course, are a
form of lawyer empowerment: class counsel negotiates a settlement,
and with the court's approval, the settlement binds all of the class
members whether they like it or not. In its newer incarnation, the
lawyer-empowerment idea is to empower plaintiffs' lawyers to make
deals on behalf of large categories of claimants but within a privately
negotiated framework rather than a class action framework. While
the Vioxx settlement is currently the most striking illustration of this
idea, it is hardly the only one. In a variety of mass tort cases,7 and in
work by leading academics,8 the idea of empowering plaintiffs' lawyers
to strike deals with defendants has taken hold. In the most fully devel-
oped academic treatment of the problem, Richard Nagareda urges a
rethinking of mass torts as a problem of governance in which plain-
tiffs' lawyers negotiate peace arrangements that replace claimants' in-
dividual rights of action with compensation rights under an
administrative grid.9
7 See, e.g., In reVioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 2008); In
re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL
682174, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d
268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
8 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 Sup. CT. REv. 183,
214-20; Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value ofSettlement, 78 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 1177, 1182-90 (2009); David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1949, 1970-73 (2008); Francis E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute,
80 TUL. L. REv. 1809, 1810-15 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil
Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 1105, 1110-15 (2010); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model
for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TuL. L. REv. 2205, 2213-16
(2008); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L.
REv. 301, 304-13 (2004); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method
of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REv. 107, 115-18
(2010).
9 RicHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 219-21 (2007).
[Vol. 96:265268
CONSENT VERSUS CLOSURE
In 2010, support for the lawyer-empowerment idea culminated in
the release of American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation.'0 In an impressive document bringing together
small and large principles regarding aggregate litigation, one provi-
sion has stood out as a centerpiece of the Reporters' efforts and a
lightning rod for debate. Section 3.17(b) presents a legal device de-
signed to allow plaintiffs' lawyers to bind clients to a group settlement.
Although the proposal would require that clients as a group ratify the
settlement by supermajority vote, it would bypass the requirement of
individual consent. The bottom line is that the ALI proposal contem-
plates a world in which a personal-injury claimant in the mass tort
setting gives up her right to decide on what settlement to accept or
whether to accept a settlement at all. In this world, plaintiffs' lawyers
will be able to settle massive cases, plaintiffs will receive compensation,
defendants will get peace, and courts will clear their dockets. One can
see why the proposal garnered enough support among plaintiffs' law-
yers, defense lawyers, judges, and academics to win approval within
the ALL. Lawyer empowerment in mass tort litigation looks like a win-
win-win-win proposal.
This Article is a critique of the lawyer-empowerment idea in mass
torts. Mechanisms that empower plaintiffs' lawyers to deliver closure
downplay the importance of client consent. Although defendants,
plaintiffs' lawyers, and judges desire a high level of closure, it is a mis-
take to assume that such closure is necessary. By contrast, the preser-
vation of certain basic aspects of client consent is essential to
settlement in nonclass aggregate litigation. Consent-not closure-
determines legitimacy.
Part I explains the search for closure in mass tort settlements and
the history that has led lawyers and academics to embrace increasingly
aggressive lawyer-empowerment strategies. Part II closely studies the
Vioxx litigation and the settlement agreement that emerged from it.
Part II.A details the strengths and the vulnerabilities of the plaintiffs'
claims, illuminating why settlement was so desirable for both sides and
why it once seemed elusive. Part II.B explains how the Vioxx Settle-
ment Agreement solved the problem posed by mass torts by giving
plaintiffs' lawyers a central role in achieving closure and lays bare the
features of the agreement that raise ethical concerns. Part III shows
how the advance-consent proposal of the Principles of the Law of Aggre-
gate Litigation aims to solve the very same predicament that the Vioxx
Settlement Agreement did; however, the proposal manages only to
shift the problems of lawyer overempowerment, not solve them. Part
IV considers consent and closure in mass tort settlements, drawing a
10 AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010) [hereinaf-
ter PRINCIPLES).
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distinction between the necessity of the former and the mere desira-
bility of the latter.
Rather than presenting an alternative strategy for achieving com-
prehensive closure in mass torts, this Article questions the idealization
of closure in its strongest form. Instead of buying into the insistence
of plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants that near-absolute closure is the
only way to resolve mass torts, this Article demands that our system
evaluate more candidly what degree of closure is truly necessary. It
demands that our system take seriously the notions that claims belong
to claimants, that inauthentic consent accomplishes nothing, and that
nonclass litigation differs from class actions despite powerful func-
tional similarities. Before we compromise even the most minimal con-
ceptions of client consent and attorney loyalty to achieve closure, we
ought to make sure we understand what closure means and how much
of it is really necessary.
I
SEEKING CLOSURE IN MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS
Mass litigation emerges quickly after some event triggers a defen-
dant's vulnerability to widespread potential liability. The trigger
might be a product recall, scientific study, whistleblower disclosure,
sudden stock drop, mass disaster, or other liability-suggesting event.
In the early stages, defendants tend to litigate vigorously, pursuing
legal and factual defenses and nearly always opposing class certifica-
tion or large-scale joint trials. If defendants succeed in their early
cases, they may nip the problem in the bud before it expands into
mass litigation. If early plaintiffs succeed, however, litigation grows
exponentially as their success encourages new plaintiffs and lawyers to
file lawsuits. While defendants routinely oppose class certification and
trial consolidation, they frequently support pretrial coordination by
multidistrict-litigation (MDL) transfer. It creates the perfect condi-
tions for an aggregate settlement: vigorous litigation that generates
information about anticipated claim values," the prospect of count-
less individual trials with their attendant expense and unpredictability,
and just enough coordination to provide a setting with counsel leader-
ship and judicial encouragement for a global settlement when the de-
fendant decides to put money on the table.
In what has become a predictable pattern, defendants fighting
mass litigation reach a point when they seek to settle claims en masse.
Up to that moment, the defendant may have insisted that it had no
interest in settling and that it would fight each case individually at
11 See Byron G. Stier, Jackpotjustice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 1013, 1056-66 (2007) (describing the usefulness of multiple individual cases
and jury verdicts for achieving accurate claim valuation in mass tort settlements).
270 [Vol. 96:265
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trial,12 but in hindsight, the early trials and procedural battles may be
seen as fights over bargaining position for the all-but-inevitable mass
settlement. The timing of this settlement moment varies. In some
cases, such as those involving asbestos, breast implants, and fen-phen,
the settlement moment occurs after defendants suffer numerous
defeats at trial. In others, such as Vioxx and OxyContin, it occurs af-
ter defendants have had notable trial success. Still in others, such as
Zyprexa and the state-attorney-general tobacco litigation, it occurs
before any actions have reached verdicts. In each case, however, the
defendant sees a risk of liability and faces the burden of lengthy and
widespread litigation.
When defendants settle mass litigation, they prefer to settle
wholesale. Not only do individual negotiations require greater re-
source expenditures, but piecemeal settlements simply do not provide
sufficient peace to allow a defendant to put a dispute behind it.
Worse, piecemeal settlements may draw more claimants into the litiga-
tion, as prospective plaintiffs and attorneys smell blood in the water.
From the defendant's perspective, the more comprehensive the deal,
the better.
During the 1990s, the preferred device for global peace in mass
litigation was the settlement class action.' 3 A defendant facing mass
litigation would negotiate with plaintiffs' lawyers to design a settle-
ment of the entire dispute on a classwide basis, and both sides would
jointly seek class certification and approval of the settlement. Parties
continue to use settlement class actions in securities, business, and
consumer cases.14 However, the Supreme Court dealt a blow to the
12 See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2007, at Al ("Promising to contest every case, Merck has spent more than $1 billion
over the last three years in legal fees. It has refused, at least publicly, to consider even the
possibility of an overall settlement to resolve all the lawsuits at once."); Julie Fishman, Com-
pany Fends Off OxyContin Lawsuits, STAMFORD ADvoc., Feb. 9, 2002, at A3 (quoting Howard
Udell, general counsel for Purdue Pharma, on the company's refusal to settle OxyContin
cases: "They file their lawsuits in the hope that they'll get a quick settlement. If someone
files a baseless claim against our company, however, they don't get a quick settlement.
They get a vigorous defense at every turn."); Alison Frankel, The Torch Is Dimming on Tort
Cases, FULTON COUNflY DAILY REP.,Jan. 10, 2007 (quoting plaintiffs' lawyer W. Mark Lanier:
"If Vioxx predated [fen-phen], you would see Merck more willing to settle instead of trying
every case. Instead, they're following the tobacco model: Try every case, take no prison-
ers." (alteration in original)); Litigation Update, DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY, Dec. 8, 2003, at I
("[Purdue Pharma] said it has not settled or suffered an adverse judgment in any OxyCon-
tin case. Purdue still faces 325 pending lawsuits but has no intention of paying anything to
settle any of them, company spokesman Tim Bannon told [Drug Industry Daily]." (citation
omitted)).
13 See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial justice, 87 GEO. L.J.
1983, 1995-2001 (1999).
14 See, e.g., Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir.
2010) (class action against health insurance company); In reIns. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.,
2712011]1
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use of settlement class actions in mass tort litigation with its decisions
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor15 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp."
Amchem involved a proposed global settlement of asbestos liability
for the Center for Claims Resolution, a consortium of defendants.
The parties negotiated a massive settlement with a detailed adminis-
trative mechanism for compensating asbestos victims who contracted
asbestosis, pleural thickening, mesothelioma, lung cancer, and certain
other cancers. After an extensive fairness hearing, the district court
approved the settlement. The Supreme Court held that approval
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)-that is, a determination
that a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate-cannot, in itself,
justify the approval of a settlement class action. Rather, a settlement
class action also must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)
for class certification.17 The asbestos claims in the Amchem settlement,
the Court said, involved too many conflicts of interest and individual-
ized issues to meet the requirements of adequate representation and
common-issue predominance.18 Because most mass tort personal-in-
jury and wrongful-death claims present too many individual issues for
class certification, the Court's holding in Amchem impedes parties' ef-
forts to use Rule 23 to accomplish global peace in mass torts. Without
"structural assurance of fair and adequate representation,"19 the
Court held, the class action device could not be used to bind claim-
ants to a mass settlement.
Two years later, in Ortiz, the Court rejected another asbestos set-
tlement class action. Instead of using Rule 23(b) (3) as the parties did
in Amchem, the parties in Ortiz had negotiated a settlement class action
under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) on a limited-fund theory. They contended
that the settlement class action was warranted because Fibreboard
Corporation's assets were insufficient to meet the claims of asbestos
plaintiffs. 20 The Court, taking a narrow view of permissible limited-
fund class actions under Rule 23, reiterated its insistence on structural
assurance of fairness.21
After Amchem and Ortiz, lawyers understood that Rule 23 was not
an easy avenue for global settlements, but they did not give up on the
possibility of mass tort settlement class actions. With more careful at-
tention to intraclass conflicts and greater structural assurance of fair-
579 F.3d 241, 264-70 (3d Cir. 2009) (class action against insurance brokers); In re SFBC
Int'l Inc., 310 F. App'x 556, 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (class action for securities fraud).
15 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
16 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
17 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621-22.
18 Id. at 622-28.
19 Id. at 627.
20 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 824-28.
21 See id. at 856.
[Vol. 96:265272
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ness, nothing in those decisions suggested that a court could not
certify an appropriate mass tort settlement class action.
Therefore, when in 1999 American Home Products (later Wyeth)
sought a global settlement of the fen-phen litigation, it negotiated a
nationwide settlement class action. To assure fairness, particularly
with regard to the future claims that played so prominent a role in
both Amchem and Ortiz, the fen-phen settlement steered clear of oner-
ous requirements on claimants. It also included a series of intermedi-
ate and back-end opt-out rights for those who were diagnosed later
with relevant injuries.22 At the time, the fen-phen settlement class ac-
tion-particularly its multiple opt-out phases dealing with future inju-
ries-appeared to be a brilliant solution to the Amchem problem, a
sophisticated way for a mass tort defendant to move toward global
peace while providing sufficient assurance of fairness to claimants. 23
The district court painstakingly distinguished Amchem and Ortiz2 4 and
found that the fen-phen settlement "provides for structural protec-
tions which make it fair to bind absent class members here."25 If
claimants' injuries became worse, "they [would be] protected by the
settlement in that they may 'step up' to higher amounts of compensa-
tion on the matrices as their level of disease progresses." 26 In addi-
tion, "unlike Amchem, there are no case flow maximums designed to
limit defendants' payments." 27 Above all, the court emphasized that
claimants would have plenty of chances to opt out: "Most importantly,
unlike Amchem, where only a small number of class members per year
had the opportunity to reject the settlement and pursue their claims
in court, the instant class has several meaningful opt out rights accom-
panied by protections against statute of limitations and claims splitting
defenses."28
If the test for success was the ability to secure judicial approval
notwithstanding the precedents of Amchem and Ortiz, the nationwide
fen-phen settlement succeeded admirably. The district court certified
the class and approved the settlement, 29 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced it by enjoining a competing
22 See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *49 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000).
23 See Lawrence T. Hoyle, Jr. & Edward W. Madeira, Jr., "The Philadelphia Story". Mass
Torts in the City of Brotherly Love, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 119, 146-50 (2001); Richard A.
Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REV.
747, 800-04 (2002).
24 See In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1222042, at *45-50.
25 Id. at *45.
26 Id. at *49.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at *69-72.
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state court proceeding.30 If the point of the settlement was peace and
predictability, however, the nationwide fen-phen settlement class ac-
tion was a failure. The number of claimants far exceeded original
expectations, as did the number of opt-outs. 3 1 Rather than bringing
the fen-phen litigation to a conclusion, the settlement class action was
the opening salvo in a long-running resolution process. The settle-
ment class action was amended multiple times as Wyeth sought to
draw additional claimants into the class. Meanwhile, Wyeth pursued
expensive firm-by-firm settlements with law firms that represented
plaintiffs who had opted out of the class settlement. By most ac-
counts, the nationwide fen-phen settlement class action turned out to
be a disaster for Wyeth.32
Amchem imposed constraints that made it impossible for parties to
settle mass torts on a classwide basis unless they bent over backward to
ensure that all claimants were treated fairly in light of intraclass con-
flicts. Fen-phen showed that when a settlement class action provided
sufficient assurances of fairness to garner post-Amchem approval, it ex-
posed the defendant to the risk of being overwhelmed by class claims
as well as by opt-outs pursuing individual claims.
This background explains the state of affairs as lawyers consid-
ered ways to resolve the burgeoning Vioxx litigation and as the ALI
weighed ideas for legal reform. Merck, looking to settle Vioxx claims,
desired above all to avoid getting "fen-phened,"33 and the Reporters
for the Pinciples of the Law ofAggregate Litigation were looking for a way
to allow plaintiffs' lawyers to offer comprehensive peace in mass tort
settlement negotiations without relying on elusive class certification.
II
TI-E Vioxx SETTLEMENT
For the past twenty years, mass tort defendants have searched
doggedly for ways to obtain closure. Outside of bankruptcy, most of
these attempts failed in one way or another-until Vioxx.
The difference between the end results of the fen-phen and Vi-
oxx national settlements is striking. The Rule 23(b) (3) settlement
class action in the fen-phen litigation turned out to be far less compre-
hensive than the nonclass settlement in Vioxx. In light of the consid-
erable efforts to use Rule 23 as the means to accomplish global
30 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Li-
tig., 282 F.3d 220, 242 (3d Cir. 2002).
31 See Alison Frankel, Still Ticking, AM. LAw., Mar. 2005, at 92, 96.
32 See McGovern, supra note 8, at 1813-15.
33 See Howard Erichson, Public and Private Law Perspectives: Transcript ofProfessor Howard
Erichson, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 665, 668 (2008) (describing the arc from asbestos to fen-phen to
Vioxx as a series of overreactions); Issacharoff, supra note 8, at 217 (describing the pressing
circumstances that drove the unusual features of the Vioxx settlement).
274 [Vol. 96:265
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resolutions,3 4  how ironic that settling without class certification
should prove a surer road to peace? Obtaining closure without Rule
23 or bankruptcy depends on two things: knowing who the claimants
are and making sure the settlement binds them. The driving strategy
of settlement class actions such as Amchem, Ortiz, and In re Diet Drugs is
to get comprehensive peace by using class certification and settlement
approval to bind unknown claimants. But settlement class actions are
incomplete because of opt-outs, and if the class action includes back-
end opt-outs to provide assurances of fairness after Amchem-the ap-
proach taken in the fen-phen settlement class action-then long-term
opt-out numbers may be substantial.
The lawyers in Vioxx understood that once the identity of the
claimants was known, a nonclass aggregate settlement could provide
as comprehensive a resolution as a class action, but only if those claim-
ants consented to be bound by the settlement. In the absence of Vi-
oxx-like terms, however, most nonclass aggregate settlements have not
accomplished truly comprehensive resolutions. In the OxyContin liti-
gation, despite a wholesale settlement of tort claims35 and a plea deal
with federal prosecutors,36 Purdue Pharma continued to face individ-
ual plaintiffs' claims.37 In the Zyprexa litigation, Eli Lilly reached a
deal in 2006 to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to settle about
8,000 claims in the federal multidistrict litigation38 and several
months later paid hundreds of millions more to settle 18,000 claims
that were not included in the first deal.3 9 Johnson & Johnson settled
34 See, e.g., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appel-
late, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 554 (1996) (proposing to amend Rule
23 to create a new category for settlement class actions that would permit class certification
where "the parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b) (3) for pur-
poses of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b) (3) might not be met
for purposes of trial"); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (attempting to
resolve asbestos liability by a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) settlement class action); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (attempting to resolve asbestos liability by a Rule
23(b) (3) settlement class action); PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.06 (proposing that settle-
ment class actions be certifiable even if they could not be certified for litigation); JAY
TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES
(1998) (describing five large-scale attempts to use Rule 23 to achieve negotiated global
resolutions of mass torts).
35 See Frank Donnelly, Oxycontin Maker Settles Suit for $75M, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE,
Jan. 27, 2007, at Al; Jim Zebora, Purdue Settles 90% of Pending OxyContin Cases, STAMFORD
ADvoc., Jan. 27, 2007.
36 See Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2007, at Al.
37 See id.
38 SeeJeff Swiatek, Judge Approves $700 Million Zyprexa Deal, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept.
28, 2006.
39 SeeJoe Schneider & Margaret Cronin Fisk, Eli Lilly Settles Zyprexa Suits with 18,000
Patients (Updatel2), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2007, 5:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aaePGELtBkx4.
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Ortho Evra claims on a piecemeal basis. 40 By striking a deal for a
nonclass settlement but including clauses for mandatory recommen-
dation and mandatory withdrawal, Merck avoided class certification
hurdles while achieving a high degree of finality.
A. Products Liability and the Vioxx Litigation
To understand the Vioxx settlement, we need an understanding
of the dispute that brought the parties to court.41 In 2000, Merck
obtained data from a study called VIGOR, which indicated that the
risk of heart attack in people taking the painkiller Vioxx was almost
five times greater than those taking another drug, Naproxen. 42 Years
before receiving the VIGOR data, Merck scientists had wondered, with
real concern, whether the very features of Vioxx that made it such an
effective painkiller might also lead it to cause more blood clotting.43
The VIGOR data came from a study that also indicated how effective
and relatively safe Vioxx was for people needing pain relievers that
did not cause gastrointestinal bleeding. The New England Journal of
Medicine published both the good and bad aspects of the study." To
be sure, this disclosure-and its disclosure to the FDA-is appropri-
ately important to Merck's defense of its conduct. However, the re-
mainder of Merck's conduct looks less impressive. Instead of
undertaking more studies of this risk, alerting prescribing physicians,
or undertaking to give stern warnings, Merck fought the FDA's efforts
to get a warning for years and marketed the drug with increasing ag-
gressiveness to a wide range of doctors and patients, deliberately un-
40 See David Voreacos, J&J Paid $68 Million to Settle Birth-Control Cases (Update3),
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2008, 4:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a9]OdhmcZq9.g.
41 In sketching out the facts, we will rely principally on the recitation of the facts in
McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). That appellate
court, of course, was not reciting the facts as it found them but rather was reciting the
"facts that could reasonably have been considered by the jury in support of its verdict." Id.
at 229. Documents and journal publications amply demonstrate many of the primary facts
that the court recites in its opinion, and the primary facts that the court describes as the basis
of the jury determination are consistent with the facts as found by the REPORT OF THE
HONORABLE JOHN S. MARTIN, JR. TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF MERCK & CO., INC. CONCERNING THE CONDucr OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT AND MARKETING OF VIOxx (2006), available at www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/
martin.report.html. For another helpful summary, see Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx's History
and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 941, 944-54
(2007) (providing the factual history of Vioxx testing and regulation).
42 FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
108th Cong. 18 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Bruce M. Psaty, M.D., Profes-
sor, Medicine and Epidemiology, University of Washington, Cardiovascular Health Re-
search Unit).
43 See McDarby, 949 A.2d at 230-32 (noting that as early as 1998, Merck scientists be-
gan to collect data systematically on all cardiovascular events in all clinical trials for Vioxx).
44 Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and
Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000).
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derplaying the grounds for concern about the drug's safety.45 It took
this position as long as it could until, in September of 2004, another
study that aimed to show the benefits of Vioxx for digestive diseases
(APPROVe) produced data that Vioxx multiplied the risk of heart dis-
ease as against those taking a placebo. Following that study, Merck
pulled Vioxx from the market and abandoned its earlier position.4 6
An onslaught of scientists, physicians, public-health advocates,
and politicians criticized Merck for holding its position for four years
rather than searching for the truth about these drug risks. 47 Critics
argued that millions of people who had no need for this drug never-
theless took it; one FDA official-Dr. David Graham-made state-
ments before Congress asserting that tens of thousands of people
probably died because of taking Vioxx.48 Moreover, unlike many
complicated toxic-tort cases, some of the data on causation in these
particular cases are strong enough to pass tort law's peculiarly high
standards.49
The evidence and trial outcomes in the Vioxx litigation suggest
that at least some of the claims had significant merit. A body of evi-
dence suggests that Merck knew or should have known of a substantial
cardiovascular risk; that it failed to disclose this risk to prescribing
physicians; that some patients would not have taken Vioxx had Merck
communicated that information to them or their physicians; and that
some of these plaintiffs died or were seriously injured because of tak-
ing Vioxx. Conversely, the drug did not injure millions of people who
took it, and many of the plaintiffs who suffered heart attacks or strokes
would have suffered them apart from taking Vioxx.
Large federal multidistrict litigation took place in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana before District Judge Eldon Fallon.50 Even larger
45 See McDarby, 949 A.2d at 239-45 (noting that Merck fought to have the VIGOR
results posted in the label's "precautions" section rather than the more prominent "warn-
ings" section and instructed sales representatives to "dodge" obstacles regarding Vioxx's
medical risks).
46 See Gilhooley, supra note 41, at 950 (explaining that Merck removed Vioxx from
the market after the APPROVe study because it believed that the study definitively proved
that Vioxx posed a higher risk of cardiovascular events).
47 See, e.g., Peter Jini et al., Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Rofecoxib: Cumulative Meta-
analysis, 364 LANCET 2021 (2004) (exploring the availability of evidence on the adverse
effects of rofecoxib prior to September 2004).
48 Hearing, supra note 42, at 14 (statement of David J. Graham, M.D., M.P.H., Associ-
ate Director for Science, Office of Drug Safety, Food and Drug Administration) (estimat-
ing that between 88,000 and 139,000 excess cases of heart attack or sudden cardiac death
were caused by Vioxx, and that 90%-40% of these patients probably died).
49 For example, Jfini et al., supra note 47, at 2021, indicate a relative risk of 2.3 for
some groups. Tort law sometimes deems a relative risk of greater than 2.0 essential. See In
re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Response
to Article byjtini et al. Published in The Lancet on Nov. 5, MERCK, www.merckfrosst.ca/assets/
en/pdf/products/vioxxwithdrawal/lancet.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
50 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006).
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statewide consolidated litigation took place before Judge Carol Hig-
bee in New Jersey,5i and sizable coordinated proceedings took place
before Judge Victoria Chaney in California 52 and Judge Randy Wilson
in Texas.5 3 Litigation of many claims also occurred elsewhere.
The results in the cases that went to trial set the stage for the mass
settlement. Consider how those results informed the lawyers' think-
ing about the risks of the litigation. Merck prevailed at trial against
the tort claims of eleven out of eighteen plaintiffs, and in two addi-
tional cases (which were consolidated before the court), Merck was
granted a mistrial.54 Of the five remaining cases where courts initially
granted verdicts for the plaintiffs, in two of these cases, the appellate
courts completely vacated the plaintiffs' verdicts, and in one case, the
appellate court reversed the trial court's punitive damages award.55 In
yet another case, the court drastically reduced the compensatory dam-
ages award.5 6 In only one case (where the plaintiff went through a
second trial) did a plaintiff not have his verdict vacated or trimmed on
appeal.57 Looking toward the possibility of settlement, both Merck
and the plaintiffs' lawyers undoubtedly knew what the win-loss record
suggested: a plaintiffs chance of winning a verdict at trial was less
than one in three, and the chances after appeal were closer to one in
six. On the other hand, both sides also knew thatjuries awarded puni-
tive damages in all five of Merck's losses.58 Moreover, the compensa-
tory damages for pain and suffering were high in all five cases.59 In
other words, five juries found enthusiastically for plaintiffs.
Two legal developments rendered the parties particularly open to
settlement. First, on the day before the announcement of the settle-
ment agreement, Judge Fallon published a decision ruling that the
statute of limitations had run on unfiled Vioxx claims, except those
claims that might have been filed in a few relatively unpopulated juris-
dictions.60 This, along with threats to start trying more cases, ren-
dered Merck more willing to relax its antisettlement stance because
the ruling reduced the probability that settlement would prompt new
51 See In re Vioxx Litig., 2006 WL 2950622, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2006).
52 See In reVioxx Consol. Class Action, No.JCCP 4247, 2009 WL 1283129 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Apr. 30, 2009).
53 See Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., Nos. 2005-59499, 2005-58543, 2007 WL 1181991
(Dist. Ct. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007).
54 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Rediscovering the Social Value ofjurisdictional Redundancy, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2394 nn.106-07 (2008) (collecting Vioxx trial outcomes); Mistrial
Granted in Vioxx Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007 (noting a mistrial of the consolidated case).
55 See Lahav, supra note 54, at 2394 n.106.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 799, 801-02 (E.D. La. 2007).
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filings. Second, the Supreme Court was about to grant certiorari on
whether FDA approval preempted state products-liability claims for
failure to warn,61 and both the FDA and the Bush administration sup-
ported preemption. 62 Many plaintiffs' lawyers worried-incorrectly, as
it turned out6 3-that the Court was on the verge of adopting a strong
preemption position that would leave Vioxx plaintiffs empty handed if
they failed to achieve a settlement.64
B. Legal Ethics and the Vioxx Settlement
1. The Settlement Agreement
Unlike many mass tort settlement agreements, the Vioxx agree-
ment was made public, 65 so the full details of its terms are available.
Merck agreed to put $4.85 billion into a compensation fund-$4 bil-
lion for heart attack victims and $850 million for stroke victims. The
deal included a walkaway clause that conditioned the settlement on
the participation of 85% of the eligible claimants in each of several
categories. To be eligible for the fund, Vioxx plaintiffs had to enroll
in the program, which required putting a release in escrow. Each
claimant had to demonstrate that he or she (or the victim in a wrong-
ful-death suit) had a heart attack or an ischemic stroke and ingested a
certain amount of Vioxx over a certain period. Additionally, a claim-
ant had to establish a temporal nexus between ingestion and injury. A
"gate committee" composed of three Merck representatives and three
plaintiff representatives determined eligibility.
Once claimants were eligible, a claims administrator would score
them. The more serious the heart attack or stroke was, the more
points the claimant received. The longer the claimants or victims
took Vioxx, the more points they received. Finally, claimants or vic-
tims who were older and had greater risk factors, such as weight, fam-
ily history, and diabetes, received fewer points. The total points of all
claimants for heart disease and stroke, divided into the total settle-
ment pot, would determine the dollar value per point. Each eligible
claimant would receive an award equal to the number of the claim-
ant's points multiplied by the value of each point. This calculation
61 See Wyeth v. Levine, 552 U.S. 1161 (2008) (granting certiorari on the issue of
preemption).
62 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2308908.
63 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
64 See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Mark Lanier Defends the Vioxx Settlement, PIIARMALOT (an. 7,
2008, 7:05 PM), www.pharmalot.com/2008/01/mark-lanier-defends-the-vioxx-settlement.
65 Merck, the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, and the Claims Administrator posted
the settlement agreement. See Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1; Vioxx Settlement
Documents, OFFICIAL Vioxx SE-T-LEMErNT, www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents (last
visited Nov. 13, 2010).
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structure meant that claimants had to decide whether to enroll before
knowing what their payments would be. Thus, the settlement pay-
ments were doubly contingent: they were contingent on how many
points the claims administrator granted and on how many dollars each
point was worth. 66
The indetenninacy that each plaintiff faced was exacerbated (or
made easier, depending on one's view) by the role that each lawyer
would play. All lawyers who signed the agreement or who enrolled
anyone in the program were obligated to recommend enrollment to
each and every client. Moreover, if the client did not find the recom-
mendation persuasive, the lawyer had something else to make the de-
cision easier: if the client did not accept the offer, the lawyer would no
longer represent the client. The option of not settling was remarkably
unattractive.
These provisions-the mandatory-recommendation provision
and the mandatory-withdrawal provision-were the two most contro-
versial aspects of the Vioxx settlement. The mandatory-recommenda-
tion provision took the form of an affirmation by participating
lawyers:
By submitting an Enrollment Form, the Enrolling Counsel affirms
that he has recommended, or . .. will recommend by no later than
[the deadline], to 100% of the Eligible Claimants represented by
such Enrolling Counsel that such Eligible Claimants enroll in the
Program.67
The mandatory-withdrawal provision, notwithstanding several ethical
caveats, clearly indicated that Merck expected participating lawyers to
cease representing any nonsettling clients. More importantly, when
deciding whether to take part in the settlement, clients would be
aware that saying "no" meant losing their lawyer:
If any such Eligible Claimant disregards such recommendation, or
for any other reason fails (or has failed) to submit a non-deficient
and non-defective Enrollment Form on or before [the deadline],
such Enrolling Counsel shall . . . [by the required date], to the ex-
tent permitted by the equivalents to Rules 1.16 and 5.6 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the relevant jurisdiction (s),
(i) take (or have taken, as the case may be) all necessary steps to
disengage and withdraw from the representation of such Eligible
Claimant and to forego any Interest in such Eligible Claimant and
(ii) cause (or have caused, as the case may be) each other Enrolling
Counsel, and each other counsel with an Interest in any Enrolled
66 The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee placed a Vioxx points "calculator" on the In-
ternet to help claimants estimate their settlement payment. See Voxx Settlement Calculator,
OFFICI Vioxx SETrLEMENT, www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/calculator (last visited Nov.
13, 2010).
67 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, § 1.2.8.1.
280 [Vol. 96:265
CONSENT VERSUS CLOSURE
Program Claimant, which has an Interest in such Eligible Claimant
to do the same.68
Other language reinforced the expectation that all of each participat-
ing law firm's eligible Vioxx clients would take part in the settlement:
"The parties agree that a key objective of the Program is that, with
respect to any counsel with an Interest in the claims of any Enrolled
Program Claimant, all other Eligible Claimants in which such counsel
has an Interest shall be enrolled in the Program."69
Some Vioxx plaintiffs' lawyers, troubled by the mandatory-recom-
mendation and mandatory-withdrawal provisions, sought a declaratory
judgment that these terms were unenforceable.7 0 In response, Merck
and the negotiating plaintiffs' lawyers added explanatory language to
the agreement: "Each Enrolling Counsel is expected to exercise his or
her independent judgment in the best interest of each client individu-
ally before determining whether to recommend enrollment in the
Program."7  Although this amendment apparently satisfied the ob-
jecting lawyers, it was put forth as a "clarification" rather than as a
substantive change; neither of the controversial provisions was
removed.72
2. Legal Ethics Problems
The mandatory-recommendation and mandatory-withdrawal pro-
visions of the Vioxx settlement run afoul of several legal ethics rules,73
as a number of commentators, including ourselves, pointed out.7 4
68 Id. § 1.2.8.2.
69 Id. § 1.2.7; see also id. Recital G ("A key objective of the Program is that, with respect
to any counsel with an Interest in the claims of any Enrolled Program Claimant, all other
Eligible Claimants in which such counsel has an Interest shall be enrolled in the
Program.").
70 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Certain Plaintiffs' and Their Counsels' Mo-
tion for Declaratory Judgment that Certain Provisions of the Settlement Agreement are
Unenforceable at 1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008)
(MDL No. 1657), 2008 WL 83836, at *1; see also Alex Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settle-
ment over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at C4.
71 See Amendment to Settlement Agreement § 1.2.2 (Jan. 17, 2008), available at www.
merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Amendmentto Settlement-Agreement.pdf.
72 See id. Recital C; see also Heather Won Tesoriero, Merck's Prospects Brighten for Vioxx
Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at A3 ("Lawyers for both sides said this is a point of
clarification but not a substantive change.").
73 We are aware of one state ethics opinion addressing the Vioxx settlement. It con-
cluded that the mandatory-recommendation and mandatory-withdrawal provisions violated
the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct. See Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 08-01
(2008) (discussing obligations of plaintiffs' counsel under a particular aggregate settle-
ment agreement).
74 See, e.g., Daniel Costello, Vioxx Deal May Cause Pain, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at Cl;
Nathan Koppel, Vioxx Plaintiffs' Choice: Settle or Lose Their Lawyer, WALL ST.J., Nov. 16, 2007,
at BI; Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer's Loyalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2008, at A12; Howard M. Erichson, The Vioxx Settlement, MASS TORT LITIG. BLOG
(Nov. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Erichson, The Vioxx Settlement], http://lawprofessors.typepad.
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Given the attractiveness of the Vioxx deal both as a resolution of the
litigation and as a model for future mass tort settlements, its deficits
warrant detailed examination.
Before explaining the problems with the Vioxx settlement, a
word is necessary about conflicts of interest in mass litigation. The
problem with the Vioxx settlement is not that Vioxx plaintiffs' interests
diverged because of differences in their cases' strengths and weak-
nesses, their litigation objectives, their risk tolerances, or other plain-
tiff-to-plaintiff dissimilarities. Nor is the problem that the settlement
contemplated dividing a fixed sum of money among a group of claim-
ants, creating a zero-sum game in the allocation of settlement funds.
Of course the interests of Vioxx plaintiffs conflicted with each other,
but the same is true, in various ways, in all mass litigation. And of
course they were competing, as a practical matter, for a finite pool of
resources. We take these conflicts as given. The interests of plaintiffs
in mass litigation do not line up perfectly, but nonetheless, most
plaintiffs in mass litigation rationally prefer representation by a lawyer
who represents numerous claimants. 75 Therefore, although concur-
rent client-client conflicts of interest exist in any mass plaintiff repre-
sentation, such conflicts ordinarily should not prevent mass
representation as long as the clients are aware of the conflicts and give
their informed consent.76 Nor should such conflicts ordinarily pre-
vent mass aggregate settlements as long as clients give informed con-
sent after the appropriate disclosure under the aggregate settlement
rule.77 The conflict-of-interest rules and the aggregate settlement rule
leave substantial room for multiple-client representation in litigation
and settlement with informed consent. Thus, the problem is not mass
collective representation itself, nor the fact of a mass aggregate settle-
com/mass-tort litigation/2007/11 /the-vioxx-settl.html; Anthony Sebok & Benjamin
Zipursky, Getting with the Program: The Vioxx Settlement, FINDLAW (Nov. 20, 2007), http://
writ.1p.findlaw.com/sebok/20071120.html; Ed Silverman, Vioxx Deal and Legal Ethics: Are
They Compatible?, PHARMALOT (Nov. 16, 2007, 8:03 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2007/
11/vioxx-deal-and-legal-ethics-debate-continues; see also Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble
with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L. REv. 979, 1000-04 (2010) [hereinafter Erichson,
The Trouble].
75 See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Laryer Loyalty and Client Autonomy
in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 543-50.
76 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.7(b) (2010) (permitting informed con-
sent to conflicts of interest if a lawyer reasonably concludes that the lawyer can give each
client competent and diligent representation).
77 See id. at R. 1.8(g):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making
an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a crimi-
nal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas,
unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.
The lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the
claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the
settlement.
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ment. Rather, the problem with the Vioxx settlement was that partici-
pating lawyers were obligated to recommend the settlement to all of
their clients and obligated to withdraw from representing clients who
refused the settlement. We turn now to the various aspects of legal
ethics that shed light on the problem.
The most fundamental point is that the decision to settle belongs
to the client, not to the client's lawyer. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, while leaving significant gray areas as to other types of
decisions, leave no doubt about who owns the decision to accept or
reject a settlement: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether
to settle a matter."78 In class actions, lawyers may seek court approval
of settlements over the objections of class representatives,79 but the
Vioxx personal-injury and wrongful-death litigation was not a certified
class action.80 In the Vioxx litigation, the claims belonged to the indi-
vidual claimants, as did the decision of whether to release those claims
in settlement. The lawyer's job is not to make the decision but rather
to advise the client about the pros and cons of the settlement offer
and, in the language or Rule 1.2(a), to "abide by" the client's decision.
A lawyer who tells the client, "Settle or you're fired!" is hardly abiding
by the client's decision.
The mandatory-recommendation provision runs afoul of the law-
yer's obligation to give a client independent and loyal advice. A law-
yer must base her advice on what she thinks is right for the client, not
what she has promised another party (particularly the adversary!) that
she will tell her client. Several ethics rules come into play. Rule 1.4,
on communication with clients, requires lawyers to explain matters as
reasonably necessary so that clients can make informed decisions.81
78 Id. at R. 1.2(a):
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's deci-
sions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule
1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is im-
pliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to
a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.
See also Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1108 (1st Cir. 1987) (permitting malpractice
claim where lawyer, who considered settlement offer inadequate, failed to transmit settle-
ment offer to client); In re Harshey, 740 N.E.2d 851, 853 (Ind. 2001) (disciplining lawyer
for accepting settlement offer contrary to client's instructions); In re Panel File No. 99-5,
607 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (Minn. 2000) (disciplining lawyer for failure to transmit client's
settlement offer to opposing party).
79 See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982).
80 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 463 (E.D. La. 2006).
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.").
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Rule 2.1, on the lawyer's role as advisor, requires lawyers to "exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice."8 2 Fi-
nally, the conflict-of-interest rules prohibit representation absent con-
sent if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's duty to a third person
will materially limit the advice that the lawyer gives to her client.8 3 It is
difficult to see how a lawyer could comply with these obligations while
agreeing to recommend the settlement to every one of her Vioxx cli-
ents. In theory, a lawyer could determine that the overall settlement
and its allocation process are satisfactory for all Vioxx claimants and,
on that basis, sincerely recommend the settlement to each of her cli-
ents. In practice, however, one wonders how a lawyer would handle
clients whose claims may be undervalued by the point-allocation sys-
tem, or whose claims would provoke unusually strong jury sympathy,
or who would make uncommonly strong witnesses, or who have high
risk tolerance, or who place significant value on the right to go to
trial, or who for any other reason might be well advised to decline the
settlement.
The mandatory-withdrawal provision presents several ethical
problems. In addition to undermining the client's decision whether
to settle,8 4 mandatory withdrawal violates the prohibition on settle-
ment provisions that restrict a lawyer's right to practice,85 as well as
the constraints on termination of the lawyer-client relationship.86
Rule 5.6(b) prohibits settlement provisions that restrict a lawyer's
right to practice: "A lawyer shall not participate in offering or mak-
ing . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to
practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy."8 7 An Ameri-
can Bar Association formal ethics opinion addressed the rule's appli-
cability to mass torts in light of the "pressure to find creative solutions
82 Id. at R. 2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent profes-
sional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political fac-
tors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.").
83 Id. at R. 1.7(a):
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if . .. (2) there is a significant risk that the repre-
sentation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a
personal interest of the lawyer.
84 See id. at R. 1.2(a).
85 See id. at R 5.6(b).
86 See id. at R. 1.16.
87 Id. at R. 5.6(b); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (1980)
("In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement that restricts his right to practice law."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13(2) (2000) ("In settling a client claim, a lawyer may not offer or
enter into an agreement that restricts the right of the lawyer to practice law, including the
right to represent or take particular action on behalf of other clients.").
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to mass tort litigation."88 It concluded that "a lawyer cannot agree to
refrain from representing present or future clients against a defen-
dant pursuant to a settlement agreement on behalf of current clients
even in the mass tort, global settlement context."89 In another case, a
federal court held that plaintiffs' lawyers violated Rule 5.6 because
they negotiated a settlement for fifty-six plaintiffs and "coerced at least
one plaintiff (if not many more) to accept the settlement by threaten-
ing to withdraw representation if the settlement were not accepted."90
To be sure, Rule 5.6(b) is itself controversial. Some commenta-
tors believe that lawyers ought to be able to agree to limit their future
representations,91 but the Vioxx settlement did not restrict taking on
new clients; much more troublingly, it restricted what a lawyer may do
for current clients.92 The Vioxx scenario is not on the periphery but
is at the core of plausible justifications for Rule 5.6(b). Mandatory
withdrawal does not hurt hypothetical clients; it hurts actual clients.
Mandatory withdrawal compromises not only loyalty to clients but also
the public policy of preventing malefactors from buying off lawyers
qua private attorneys general.
We turn now to the ethical constraints on terminating a law-
yer-client relationship. This concern is intuitively quite strong and
legally quite subtle: it is the question of whether a lawyer may with-
draw from representing a client who rejects the lawyer's recommenda-
tion to accept a settlement. The first-and easier-question concerns
whether, when an individual client declines to participate in an aggre-
gate settlement that other clients would accept, the lawyer ethically
must withdraw from representing that client. Rule 1.16 governs termi-
88 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993).
89 Id.
90 Adams v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 96-2473, 2001 WL 34032759, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 29, 2001).
91 See, e.g., Feldman v. Minars, 658 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (App. Div. 1997); Stephen Gillers
& Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-Sue Promises in Settlement Agree-
ments, 18 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 291, 294 (2005); Stephen Gillers, A Rule Without a Reason:
Let the Market, Not the Bar, Regulate Settlements That Restrict Practice, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at
118.
92 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, §§ 1.2.8.1, 1.2.8.2. Although Rule
5.6(b) usually arises in the context of a settlement provision that restricts a lawyer's ability
to take on future clients with claims against the defendant, there is no doubt about its
applicability to restrictions on representing current nonsettling clients. SeeAss'n of the Bar
of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 1999-03 (1999) ("We believe that this rule is unambiguous
in its application to agreements not to represent present or future clients in litigation
against a settling defendant."); Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 92 (199?)
("Practice restrictions of the kind prohibited in Rule 5.6(b) are clearly overbroad and anti-
thetical to a lawyer's ability to practice. Where the lawyer is representing contemporane-
ously settling and non-settling claimants, such restrictions could create an irreconcilable
conflict of interest."); State Bar of Mich., Op. CI-1165 (1986) (stating that a lawyer behaves
unethically when she proposes or accepts settlement in which she agrees to withdraw from
representing other clients with pending cases against same defendant).
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nation of the lawyer-client relationship; it addresses both mandatory
and permissive withdrawal. Rule 1.16(a) requires a lawyer to withdraw
if continued representation of a client would "result in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct."9 3  Thus, when a representation
presents an impermissible conflict of interest, a lawyer generally must
withdraw.
Under some circumstances, settlement offers may create conflicts
that require withdrawal.9 4 If withdrawal were mandatory, the lawyer
ordinarily would have to withdraw from representing all of the clients,
absent consent.95 A lawyer may not drop one client like a "hot potato"
to take on a more lucrative client.96 In other words, to whatever ex-
tent rejection of the Vioxx settlement might present a conflict of in-
terest justifying withdrawal under Rule 1.16(a), the conflict could
require withdrawal from representing all the clients-settling as well
as nonsettling-which is obviously not what the settling lawyers had in
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.16(a)(1) (2010).
94 See N.C. State Bar, Op. 251 (1997) (discussing that if a lawyer represents four per-
sonal-injury claimants and the insurance coverage cannot compensate all four clients fully,
the lawyer may have to withdraw from representing all of the clients if they do not agree on
a settlement: "The lawyer must withdraw from the representation of all of the claimants if
the lawyer is placed in the role of advocate for one or more of the claimants against the
other claimants. The lawyer must also withdraw from the representation if one or more of
the claimants do not agree to accept the settlement offer. If the lawyer must withdraw, the
lawyer may continue to represent one or more of the claimants only with the consent of
the claimants whose cases the lawyer relinquishes."); Bd. of Prof'I Responsibility of the
Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal Op. 95-F-136 (1995) (stating that when an attorney repre-
sents both a personal-injury claimant and the client's health insurer with a subrogation
interest, "[a]t the time of the initial contact by the health insurance provider, the attorney
should advise the health insurance provider both orally and in writing that if both clients
do not agree on the proposed settlement, then the lawyer may not continue his multiple
employment and must withdraw from representing the health insurer."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAwYERs § 128 cmt. d(i), illus. 2 (2000) (stating that in a
two-client aggregate settlement with insufficient coverage for both claimants, "[i]f one cli-
ent wishes to accept and the other wishes to reject the proposed settlement, Lawyer may
continue to represent both A and B only after a renewal of informed consent by each.").
95 See N.C. State Bar, Op. 251.
96 See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stating that a law firm may not "force [plaintiff] to accept a second-class level of
clienthood . .. in order that [the law firm] may continue to represent a more preferred
client in all pending cases"); ValuePart, Inc. v. Clements, No. 06 C 2709, 2006 WL 2252541,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2006) ("When a lawyer or law firm suddenly finds itself in a situation
of simultaneously representing clients who either are presently adverse or are on the verge
of becoming adverse, it may not simply to [sic] drop one client 'like a hot potato' in order
to treat it as though it were a former client for the purpose of resolving a conflict of inter-
est dispute."); Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367 (D.NJ. 2001) ("The 'Hot Potato
Doctrine' has evolved to prevent attorneys from dropping one client like a 'hot potato' to
avoid conflict with another, more remunerative client."); In re Kittrels, No. EDU 99-06S,
2007 WL 92400, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 29, 2006) ("'One of the most basic
responsibilities incumbent on a lawyer is the duty of loyalty to his or her clients.' This duty
of loyalty precludes an attorney from dropping a client like a 'hot potato' in order to avoid
a conflict with 'another, more remunerative' client." (citations omitted) (quoting State ex
rel. S.G., 814 A.2d 612, 616 (N.J. 2003), and Santacroce, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 367)).
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mind. But we are not suggesting that the Vioxx settlement required
withdrawal. In the context of mass aggregate settlements, addressing
conflicts of interest through the disclosure and informed-consent pro-
visions of Rule 1.8(g) is more sensible than requiring withdrawal
whenever client choices diverge. We are simply pointing out that a
conflict-of-interest argument in support of Rule 1.16(a) withdrawal
would not establish a basis for conveniently withdrawing only from
nonsettling clients.
The second and more difficult question concerns permissive with-
drawal: if a lawyer wishes to withdraw from a client who declines a
recommended settlement, may the lawyer terminate the relationship?
Rule 1.16(b) permits a lawyer to withdraw from representing a client
for no reason at all if the withdrawal will have no material adverse
effect on the interests of the client.9 7 In the Vioxx case, a client's
search for replacement counsel would be complicated by the fact that
nearly every Vioxx plaintiffs' lawyer participated in the settlement and
thus agreed to get out of the business of Vioxx litigation. It is hard to
imagine, under these circumstances, a straight-faced argument that
withdrawal would not adversely affect the clients.
Even if termination would have a material adverse effect, Rule
1.16(b) permits withdrawal for a number of reasons. These include
where "(4) the client insists upon taking action . . . with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement," "(6) the representation will
result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been
rendered unreasonably difficult by the client," and "(7) other good
cause for withdrawal exists."9 8 A lawyer withdrawing from a nonset-
ding Vioxx client might seek to justify the withdrawal under Rule
1.16(b) (4) on the grounds that the lawyer fundamentally disagrees
with the client's decision to reject the settlement. In a similar vein,
the lawyer might contend that the client, by refusing to cooperate in
the settlement, has rendered the representation unreasonably diffi-
cult within the meaning of Rule 1.16(b)(6). The problem with both
of these arguments is that they assume the settlement decision be-
longs to the lawyer despite Rule 1.2(a)'s clear instruction that the law-
yer shall abide by the client's decision whether to accept or reject a
settlement.
Cases overwhelmingly reject the idea that a lawyer may fire a cli-
ent for declining a settlement against the lawyer's advice. In one
case,9 9 a law firm negotiated an aggregate settlement. When one cli-
ent, DeFlumer, refused to sign the release, the firm sought to termi-
97 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.16(b) (1).
98 Id. at R. 1.16(b).
99 DeFlumer v. LeSchack & Grodensky P.C., No. 99-CV-1650, 2000 WL 654608
(N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2000).
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nate its representation of DeFlumer. The court denied the withdrawal
application:
The only possible ground for good cause here which can be found
in the law firm's motion is DeFlumer's refusal to enter into the set-
tlement agreement negotiated by the law firm. There is no indica-
tion that DeFlumer ever approved or consented to the settlement.
The mere fact that an attorney and client may disagree over a pro-
posed settlement will not establish good cause for withdrawal of
representation.10 0
In another case, a client refused to execute documents needed to ef-
fect a settlement that the lawyer had negotiated; the lawyer sought to
withdraw on the grounds that the client was not cooperating. 10 1 The
court rejected the application, stating that although the rule permits
withdrawal when a client renders it unreasonably difficult for a lawyer
to carry out his work, "a client's refusal to accept a settlement gener-
ally does not constitute the kind of uncooperative behavior which is
sufficient to authorize an attorney to withdraw."102
In Nehad v. Mukasey,10 a lawyer represented an immigrant from
Afghanistan in a removal proceeding. The client wished to pursue a
claim for asylum based on fear of persecution by the Taliban. The
lawyer counseled the client that the asylum claim was weak and recom-
mended that the client accept voluntary departure. 0 4 On the facts as
accepted for purposes of the appeal, the lawyer threatened to with-
draw if the client proceeded with the asylum claim. 0 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that such a threat constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel that denied the client due process in the immigration pro-
100 Id. at *1 (citing Marrero v. Christiano, 575 F. Supp. 837, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Borup v. Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 808, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Busby, 616
N.Y.S.2d 755, 756 (App. Div. 1994)).
101 Busby, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 756. At the time of the DeRumer and Busby cases, New York
relied upon the Code of Professional Responsibility-a predecessor to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct-and thus the courts looked to the Code's Disciplinary Rules. New York
adopted new Rules of Professional Conduct that went into effect on April 1, 2009, includ-
ing a rule based in significant part on the Model Rule 1.16. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDucr R. 1.16 (2009).
102 Busby, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 756; see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Intracom Corp., No. CV 02-
4367, 2007 WL 1593208, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2007) ("Certainly, a refusal to accept a
settlement, even though favored by an attorney, is not just cause for withdrawal by an
attorney." (emphases omitted) (quoting Marrero, 575 F. Supp. at 839)); Welch v. Niagara
Falls Gazette, No. 98-CV-0685E(M), 2000 WL 1737947, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2000)
("[A] client's refusal to accept a settlement offer is not good cause for an attorney to with-
draw. The client decides whether or not to accept a settlement offer, and this decision is
binding on [the] attorney even if it is against the attorney's advice."); ABA/BNALAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDucr 31:1106-07 (2004) (citing Estate of Falco v. Decker,
233 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1987); Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 244 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Michael D. Tully Co. v. Dollney, 537 N.E.2d 242 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)).
103 535 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008).
104 Id. at 965.
105 Id. at 967-68.
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ceeding. The court noted the general rule that "the lawyer may not
burden the client's ability to make settlement decisions by structuring
the representation agreement so as to allow the lawyer to withdraw, or
to ratchet up the cost of representation, if the client refuses an offer
of settlement,"1 0 6 as well as the general rule that "a lawyer may not
withdraw merely because a client refuses to settle."107 Based on these
principles, the court held that "a lawyer may not burden a client's
decisionmaking by threatening to withdraw if the client refuses to set-
tle."10 Whether the stakes are immigration status or tort compensa-
tion, the settlement decision belongs to the client; a lawyer may not
use the threat of withdrawal to hijack that decision.' 09
Lawyers might contend that representation of nonsettling Vioxx
claimants would result in "an unreasonable financial burden" justify-
ing withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b) (6). Compared with the certainty
of payout under Merck's settlement program, plaintiffs' lawyers might
regard bringing a case to trial as a highly questionable investment.
The problem with this argument is that when the lawyer agreed to
represent each Vioxx claimant, the lawyer could not assume that
Merck would offer a settlement, and even if it did, the lawyer could
not assume that the client would accept the offer. The lawyers did not
limit the scope of their representation to pursuing settlement."10
Finally, lawyers might look to the catch-all provision of Rule
1.16(b)(7), which permits a lawyer to terminate the relationship if
"other good cause for withdrawal exists.""' As discussed above, the
client's rejection of a settlement does not in itself constitute good
106 Id. at 971 (citing Compton v. Kittleson, 171 P.3d 172, 173 (Alaska 2007); Jones v.
Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 926
P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1996); Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 99-18 (1999); Conn. Bar Ass'n,
Informal Op. 95-24 (1995); State Bar of Mich., Op. RI-132 (1992)).
107 Nehad, 535 F.3d at 971 (citing Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A., 76
F.3d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1996); Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520, 523-24
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975)).
108 Id.
109 Quantum meruit cases reach the same conclusion. See, e.g., Estate of Falco v.
Decker, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815-16 (Ct. App. 1987) ("A client's right to reject settlement is
absolute.. .. A client's exercise of this right cannot constitute cause for the purpose of
awarding attorneys' fees."); May v. Seibert, 264 S.E.2d 643, 646 (W. Va. 1980) ("No cases
are cited and we have found none, that state that refusal by a client to accept a 'reasonable'
settlement is good cause for withdrawal.").
110 Under Rule 1.2(c), a lawyer "may limit the scope of the representation if the limita-
tion is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent." MODEL
RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.2(c) (2010). We doubt whether, under the circumstances
of the Vioxx litigation, a lawyer could properly limit the scope of representation so that
clients understood that the lawyer represented them solely for purposes of a possible settle-
ment. Without the leverage of adjudication, a lawyer could not adequately pursue the
interests of tort claimants. In any event, such limited representation is not the scenario
that the actual Vioxx case presents.
111 Id. at R. 1.16(b) (7).
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cause for withdrawal, but could a contractual obligation constitute
good cause? The Vioxx Settlement Agreement required lawyers to
take steps to withdraw from representing any client who declined the
settlement. Does the lawyers' obligation to Merck provide good cause
for withdrawal? Surely it does not, at least if we are correct in our
analysis that the mandatory-withdrawal provision violates the lawyers'
duties under Rules 1.2, 1.7, and 5.6. Ethically prohibited cause can-
not be good cause. Stepping back, the very idea that entering into a
contract with a client's adversary could establish good cause to with-
draw from representing a client is troubling.
The Vioxx Settlement Agreement included language aimed at
protecting against some of these criticisms. Section 1.2.8 disavowed
any intent to violate Rule 5.6:
[N]othing in this Agreement is intended to operate as a "restric-
tion" on the right of any Claimant's counsel to practice law within
the meaning of the equivalent to Rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in any jurisdictions in which Claim-
ant's Counsel practices or whose rules may otherwise apply ... .12
More significantly, section 1.2.8.2, which articulated the duty to with-
draw, qualified the duty with language indicating that the duty to with-
draw exists only insofar as it is consistent with legal ethics:
[S]uch Enrolling Counsel shall, . . . to the extent permitted by the
equivalents to Rules 1.16 and 5.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in the relevant jurisdiction(s), (i) take (or have
taken, as the case may be) all necessary steps to disengage and with-
draw from the representation of such Eligible Claimant [who fails to
accept the settlement] . . . .113
To a great extent, these clauses are defensive verbiage, and the
work they are actually supposed to do is unclear. One cannot cure an
unethical agreement by declaring it to be ethical. The announcement
that "nothing in this Agreement is intended" to violate Rule 5.6(b)
does not change the fact that the agreement instructs lawyers to termi-
nate their representation of nonsettling clients. Whether or not it is
intended to violate Rule 5.6(b), the agreement does restrict practice in
violation of that rule.
What about the caveat in section 1.2.8.2 that lawyers should with-
draw only "to the extent permitted by" Rules 1.16 and 5.6? If this
language is taken seriously, especially in combination with the declara-
tion that nothing in the agreement is intended to restrict practice in
violation of Rule 5.6, then neither the intent nor the terms of the
agreement required counsel to withdraw from representing clients
112 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, § 1.2.8.
113 Id. § 1.2.8.2.
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who declined the settlement. Obedience to Rules 1.16 and 5.6 would
compel plaintiffs' counsel not to withdraw from representing their
nonsettling clients. Such a reading, however, would render the clause
meaningless. The defensive verbiage, at least, might provide some
contractual comfort to a lawyer who refuses to withdraw from repre-
senting nonsettling claimants, but surely the intent of the clause was
to put pressure on the participating lawyers to get all of their clients
on board. If participating lawyers were expected to terminate their
representation of any nonsettling plaintiffs-an expectation contrary
to the dictates of Rules 1.16 and 5.6-then it is hard to take seriously
the "to the extent permitted by" language.
A similar analysis applies to the amendment reached two months
after the initial settlement agreement, inserting the following lan-
guage: "Each Enrolling Counsel is expected to exercise his or her in-
dependent judgment in the best interest of each client individually
before determining whether to recommend enrollment in the Pro-
gram."114 Of course, every lawyer should exercise independent judg-
ment in determining whether to recommend the settlement
agreement to each client. Merely saying so, without altering either
the mandatory-recommendation clause of section 1.2.8.1 or the
mandatory-withdrawal clause of section 1.2.8.2, hardly eliminates the
ethical concerns. Too little, too late, too boilerplate.
This defensive verbiage raises another important question: Who
decides disputes about compliance? Under the Vioxx Settlement
Agreement, disputes about interpretation and compliance are
brought to the Chief Administrator.'1 5 This brings us to one of the
most interesting and disarming. features of the settlement agree-
ment-the identity of the Chief Administrator. The Chief Administra-
tor is Judge Eldon Fallon,' 1 6 the federal district judge who presided
over the Vioxx MDL and who played a major role in pushing the par-
ties to settle. As each of us has pointed out, judges who oversee mass
litigation face a powerful set of incentives to aid settlement."' 7 The
judge who pushed for the settlement, agreed to implement it, and
stands to benefit from it is unlikely to resolve controversies over the
settlement in ways that endanger its satisfactory conclusion.
114 Amendment to Settlement Agreement, supra note 71, § 1.2.2.
115 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, § 8.1.2 ("Except as specifically provided
in this Agreement, any dispute that arises .. . shall be submitted to the Chief Administrator
who shall sit as a binding arbitration panel and whose decision shall be final, binding and
Non-Appealable.")
116 See id. § 6.1.1.
117 See Erichson, The Vioxx Settlement, supra note 74 (noting that settlements clear away a
significant number of "docket-clogging" cases and can also reflect personal victories and
professional accomplishments for judges); Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 74 (commenting
that judges often regard settlements as accomplishments that circumvent the arduous and
time-consuming task of trying individual plaintiffs in mass litigation cases).
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In sum, the Vioxx settlement-in so many ways an appealing res-
olution of an enormous and difficult dispute-secured nearly unani-
mous participation in part by including two terms that violated well-
established principles of legal ethics. The mandatory-recommenda-
tion provision is inconsistent with the lawyer's duty to give indepen-
dent and loyal advice to clients. The mandatory-withdrawal provision
violates the bar on practice restrictions, the constraints on terminating
the lawyer-client relationship, and the principle that the decision to
accept or reject a settlement belongs to the client.
III
ADVANCE CONSENT
When the ALI undertook a major project to rethink mass litiga-
tion-the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Principles), which
will be published this year-it recognized that it could not sensibly
limit the project to class actions. Acknowledging the fundamental
similarities between class and nonclass aggregate proceedings,118 as
well as the similarities between formally and informally aggregated liti-
gation,119 the project encompassed issues that arise in nonclass as well
as class action settings. Similarly, the ALI recognized that it could not
limit the project to adjudication because settlement accounts for a far
greater share of mass dispute resolutions.120 Thus, a significant por-
tion of the Principles addresses nonclass aggregate settlements.12' In-
deed, Reporter Samuel Issacharoff described the proposal on
nonclass aggregate settlements as "probably the single greatest contri-
bution" of the project. 122
118 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 1.02(a)-(b) (defining "aggregate lawsuit" and "ad-
ministrative aggregation" as types of aggregate proceedings that include both class and
nonclass actions); see also Erichson, supra note 75, at 530 (describing the functional similar-
ity between class actions and nonclass litigation in which "numerous plaintiffs depend
upon the work of counsel with whom they have no meaningful individual lawyer-client
relationship, over whom they have no meaningful control, and whose loyalty is directed
primarily to the interests of the group as a whole").
119 See PIUNCIPLs, supra note 10, § 1.02(c) (defining "private aggregation" as a type of
aggregate proceeding); see also Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and
Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKE L.J. 381,
417-48 (2000) (exploring how lawyers handle related claims on a coordinated basis even
in the absence of formal judicial aggregation).
120 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.01 cmt. a. For an article in which two ALI Report-
ers note that both class and nonclass actions are resolved far more often by settlement than
by trial, see Issacharoff & Klonoff, supra note 8, at 1200-01.
121 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.15-18.
122 Discussion of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, 86 A.L.I. PRoc. 229 (2009)
[hereinafter 2009Discussion ofPrinciples of the Law ofAggregate Litigation] (remarks of Profes-
sor Samuel Issacharoff) ("My personal view is that this is probably the single greatest con-
tribution of our project: to take this area on directly, something that has not been done
before."); see also Discussion of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, 85 A.L.I. PROC. 27
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 Discussion ofPrinciples of the Law ofAggregate Litigation] (remarks of
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The ALI proposal would allow clients to consent at the outset of a
representation to be bound by an aggregate settlement based on a
supermajority vote. Put differently, the proposal is that lawyers may
have their clients empower them, in advance, to negotiate binding
settlements on their behalf as part of a collective resolution of claims.
The difficulties in the Vioxx Settlement Agreement, and those like it,
are not finessed but are plainly addressed by disclosure and consent at
the front end of the lawyer-client relationship. Indeed, the ALI Re-
porters pointed to the ethical difficulties of the Vioxx settlement as a
reason to support the advance-consent proposal.123
Two types of concerns bedevil the ALI proposal, however. First,
there are grave reasons to doubt that our legal system can generate, in
any systematic way, authentic client consent to a waiver of the right to
decide individually on a settlement agreement. Second, the conflicts
of interest within a pool of plaintiffs render multiple representation
only partially consentable. At least in cases that present serious alloca-
tion issues, back-end individual settlement control cannot be waived
without fundamentally altering the lawyer-client relationship.
A. The American Law Institute Proposal
The Pinciples propose a dramatic shift in the ethics rules gov-
erning nonclass aggregate settlements. Before reaching that propo-
sal, however, the Principles offer several useful clarifications of the
aggregate settlement rule currently in effect.124 Most importantly, the
Principles offer a coherent definition of the term aggregate settlement for
purposes of the informed-consent requirement.125 In addition, the
Principles suggest that counsel can satisfy the disclosure requirements
either by allowing each claimant to review "the settlements of all other
persons subject to the aggregate settlement" or by informing each
Professor Samuel Issacharoff) ("Let me say why we think that this is perhaps as single a
contribution as the Institute will make in this area if this is approved.").
123 See 2008 Discussion of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 122 (re-
marks of Professor Samuel Issacharoff) (commenting that the advance-consent approach
"would have avoided many of the ethical difficulties in the Vioxx case"); id. (remarks of
Professor Richard Nagareda) (noting the mandatory-withdrawal provision of the Vioxx set-
tlement and commenting that "[w]e believe that instead of putting that kind of pressure
on the lawyer-client relationship, we should invigorate disclosure and contract in
advance").
124 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2010).
125 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.16. Because the aggregate settlement rule is, at
bottom, a rule about informed consent to conflicts of interest, the Principles sensibly define
aggregate settlement in terms of interdependence. Interdependence, in turn, is defined
broadly in terms of features that commonly appear in group settlements-collective alloca-
tion or collective conditionality. Id. § 3.16 cmts. a-c; see also Howard M. Erichson, A Typol-
ogy of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1769, 1784-95 (2005) (proposing that
aggregate settlements be defined in terms of collective allocation and collective
conditionality).
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claimant of "the formula by which the settlement will be divided
among all claimants."126 They usefully add that "informed consent
requires that the total financial interest of claimants' counsel be dis-
closed to each claimant."127
The major ALI proposal on aggregate settlements picks up on an
idea that Professors Charles Silver and Lynn Baker advanced in the
1990s. 1 2 8 Their idea was to permit lawyers to obtain advance settle-
ment consent from clients. If clients agree in advance to be bound by
a group settlement as long as certain conditions are met-that is, if
clients waive their individual right to reject a settlement after its actual
terms are known-then the lawyer can negotiate with the defendant
for comprehensive peace. In the ALI version, the clients could agree
at the outset of the representation to be bound by an aggregate settle-
ment provided that a supermajority of the client group approves the
settlement.129 This would permit plaintiffs' lawyers to negotiate fully
comprehensive settlements (at least, fully comprehensive with regard
to the clients who the particular lawyer or group of lawyers represents
and who signed the advance consent).130
The proposal generated significant controversy. Professor Nancy
Moore published a powerful critique of the proposal from the per-
spective of legal ethics.13' A motion to reject the proposal at the ALI's
Annual Meeting in 2008132 drew enough support to persuade the Re-
porters and membership to table the proposal until the following
year.' 33 After additional safeguards were added, the proposal finally
passed in 2009.
126 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(a).
127 Id.
128 See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, The Aggregate Settlement Rule and Ideals of Client
Service, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 227, 228-40 (1999); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You
Choose: The Role of Plaintuffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465,
1500-06 (1998); Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement
Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 733, 736 (1997) [hereinafter Silver & Baker, Mass Lawsuits].
129 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(b)-(f) (proposing that claimants be allowed to
enter into an agreement to be bound by an aggregate settlement proposal and listing the
specific requirements for such an agreement).
130 For a similar proposal to permit binding nonclass aggregate settlements based on
supermajority vote, see Katherine Dirks, Note, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of
Mass Torts: A Proposal to Revise Rule 1.8(g), 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 501, 524-30 (2008).
131 See Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute's Draft Poposal to Bypass the Aggregate
Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REv.
395, 402-16 (2008) (critiquing the advance-consent proposal in an earlier draft of the
Principles).
132 See Submission of Motion to Delete Sections 3.17(b) Through 3.19 of Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation Tentative Draft No. 1 (May 13, 2008) (available at www.ali.
Org/doc/Motion-AggLit-Stewart.pdf) (arguing that Sections 3.17(b)-(c), 3.18, and 3.19
are "unwise, unwarranted and/or unworkable").
133 See 2008 Discussion of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 122 (re-
marks of Director Lance Liebman and Mr. Larry S. Stewart).
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The ALI proposal presents advance consent as an alternative to
informed consent under the aggregate settlement rule. As under cur-
rent law,134 an aggregate settlement would be binding if each party
gives informed consent to the settlement after learning the terms of
the deal. 1 3 5 In a marked departure from current law, however, the
proposal would permit binding aggregate settlements based on ad-
vance consent:
In lieu of [informed consent after the settlement terms are known],
individual claimants may, before the receipt of a proposed settle-
ment offer, enter into an agreement in writing through shared
counsel allowing each participating claimant to be bound by a sub-
stantial-majority vote of all claimants concerning an aggregate-settle-
ment proposal (or, if the settlement significantly distinguishes
among different categories of claimants, a separate substantial-ma-
jority vote of each category of claimants). 1 3 6
The proposal emphasizes that the claimants retain the collective
power to reject a settlement through the voting procedure. The
claimants may not assign the settlement power to counsel, although
they may delegate it to an "independent agent."137 The proposal envi-
sions that a client can give advance consent at the time the client re-
tains the lawyer or thereafter. 3 8
Finally, echoing the law of class actions,139 the proposal incorpo-
rates a substantive requirement that the settlement itself be "fair and
reasonable," envisioning that courts would refuse to enforce an unrea-
sonable settlement achieved through the advance-consent and
supermajority voting process:
[T]he enforceability of a settlement approved through an agree-
ment under [the advance-consent mechanism] should depend on
whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the settlement is
substantively fair and reasonable. Facts and circumstances to be
considered include the costs, risks, probability of success, and delays
in achieving a verdict; whether the claimants are treated equitably
(relative to each other) based on their facts and circumstances; and
134 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.8(g) (2010).
135 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(a) ("A lawyer or group of lawyers who represent
two or more claimants on a non-class basis may settle the claims of those claimants on an
aggregate basis provided that each claimant gives informed consent in writing.").
136 Id. § 3.17(b).
137 Id. § 3.17(b)(1) ("The power to approve a settlement offer must at all times rest
with the claimants collectively and may under no circumstances be assigned to claimants'
counsel. Claimants may exercise their collective decisionmaking power to approve a settle-
ment through the selection of an independent agent other than counsel.").
138 Id. § 3.17(b) (2) ("The agreement among the claimants may occur at the time the
lawyer-client relationship is formed or thereafter, but only if all participating claimants
give informed consent.").
139 See FED. R. Cry. P. 23(e) (2) (permitting settlement of a class action only upon a
judicial finding that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate").
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whether particular claimants are disadvantaged by the settlement
considered as a whole. 140
It also would permit claimants to challenge the fairness of the settle-
ment in court. 14 1 The proposal replaces the individual claimant's de-
cision about whether to accept a settlement with a lawyer's
presentation of the deal, a group vote, and the possibility of a judicial
ruling on whether the settlement is fair and reasonable.
B. Current Law on Advance Consent
The ALI proposal would require a striking reversal of current law.
Every court and ethics committee that has considered the issue has
concluded that advance consent cannot satisfy the aggregate settle-
ment rule.142 Outside of class actions, settlements are binding only on
those claimants who consent to the settlement. When an aggregate
settlement resolves the claims of multiple parties, it requires "in-
formed consent" based on disclosure of the settlement terms. 143 In-
formed consent, within the meaning of the ethics rule, requires client
consent after the terms of the settlement are known.
In Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.,'"4 eighteen asbestos plain-
tiffs represented by a single lawyer had agreed to be bound by a major-
ity vote on settlement. Thirteen of them approved a settlement on the
eve of trial; Eugene and Judy Hayes and three others objected. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
objecting clients could not be bound: "An agreement such as the pre-
sent one which allows a case to be settled contrary to the wishes of the
client and without his approving the terms of the settlement is op-
posed to the basic fundamentals of the attorney-client relation-
ship."' 4 5 Other courts have adopted the reasoning and conclusion of
Hayes.146
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the same conclusion on
the impermissibility of advance consent in The Tax Authoity, Inc. v.
140 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(e),
141 Id. § 3.18.
142 See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894-95 (10th Cir. 1975); Knis-
ley v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883, 887-88 (111. App. Ct. 1986); In re Hoffman, 883
So. 2d 425, 433-34 (La. 2004); The Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512,
522 (NJ. 2006); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006);
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2009-6 (2009); see also SECTION OF LITIG.,
AM. BAR Ass'N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGoTIATIONS § 3.2.3 (2002); Erich-
son, supra note 125, at 1809; Nancy 3. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settle-
ment Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 149, 165 (1999).
143 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (g) (2010).
144 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975).
145 Id. at 894.
146 See Knisley, 497 N.E.2d at 887-88; Hoffman, 883 So. 2d at 433-34.
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Jackson-Hewitt, Inc.,1 47 although that case presented a far more compel-
ling scenario for deploying an advance-consent mechanism. In Tax
Authority, 154 tax-preparation business owners sued their common
franchisor over a dispute concerning the payment of rebates for Re-
fund Anticipation Loans (RALs). The franchise agreement prohib-
ited class actions, so the franchisees instead hired a single lawyer who
filed a lawsuit naming all 154 clients as plaintiffs. Each of the plain-
tiffs signed an identical retainer agreement providing that the lawyer
would represent the plaintiffs collectively, that a steering committee
would make decisions on behalf of all of the plaintiffs, and that the
plaintiffs would share responsibility for fees on a per-RAL basis. The
retainer agreement provided that all plaintiffs would be bound by a
settlement if a weighted majority approved the deal:
[T] he Client agrees that the Matter may be resolved by settlement
as to any portion or all of the Matter upon a vote of a weighted
majority of the Client and all of the Co-Plaintiffs. Each Plaintiff
shall have one vote for each funded RAL for the 2002 Tax Season.
The Client will be eligible to vote only if current in all payments
required under this agreement .... A quorum for such vote shall
be sixty percent (60%) of the votes eligible to be cast.1 4 1
The retainer agreement further specified that settlement proceeds
would be allocated "according to each plaintiff's proportionate share
of the RAL reserve."1 4 9 Mediation led to a settlement agreement that
received the affirmative vote of a weighted majority of the plaintiffs;
eighteen plaintiffs opposed the deal. The defendant moved to en-
force the settlement, and the trial court granted the motion.1 5 0 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, following Hayes, held that the advance-
consent provision was impermissible under the Rules of Professional
Conduct:
We conclude that RPC 1.8(g) forbids an attorney from obtaining
consent in advance from multiple clients that each will abide by a
majority decision in respect of an aggregate settlement. Before a
client may be bound by a settlement, he or she must have knowl-
edge of the terms of the settlement and agree to them.1 5 1
Interestingly, the court chose to apply its ruling only prospectively,
affirming the district court's enforcement of the settlement. 15 2
Ethics opinions have reached the same conclusion about the in-
adequacy of advance consent. In a 2006 ethics opinion, the American
147 898 A.2d 512 (NJ. 2006).
148 Id. at 515.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 516-17.
151 Id. at 522-23.
152 Id. at 523.
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Bar Association spelled out the disclosures that a lawyer must make to
obtain clients' informed consent under Rule 1.8(g) and noted that
the rule presumes the existence of a particular settlement offer:
"These detailed disclosures must be made in the context of a specific
offer or demand. Accordingly, the informed consent required by the
rule generally cannot be obtained in advance of the formulation of
such an offer or demand."15 3
In 2009, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York re-
leased an ethics opinion on aggregate settlements that took up the
question of advance consent.154 The opinion addressed two related
questions concerning advance settlement consent by jointly repre-
sented clients: First, "may the clients delegate complete authority to
their lawyer to negotiate and bind them collectively to a settlement,
thereby waiving any right to review and approve the settlement before
it is concluded by counsel"?155 Second, may the clients "agree to be
bound collectively to any aggregate settlement approved by a specified
number or percentage of those clients, following counsel's disclosure
of the terms of the proposed settlement"?15 6 The committee an-
swered no to both questions, concluding that the disclosure and con-
sent required for aggregate settlements must be made in the context
of a particular settlement offer.1 57
In the context of appraising the ALI proposal, our recitation of
these authorities might appear to be something of a non sequitur.
These cases and ethics opinions articulate their criticisms in terms of
the positive norms of the current law governing lawyers. The ALI pro-
posal is not put forward as an interpretation of the current aggregate
settlement rule; it is put forward as a needed change. As we explain
below, however, our opposition to advance consent is not simply a call
for compliance with current legal ethics rules. Rather, we ground our
objection to advance consent in the principles underlying a proper
conception of the lawyer-client relationship and control over claims.
The ALI proposal would shift power from clients to lawyers in ways
that not only raise concerns about the authenticity of consent but also
put lawyers in a role that is inconsistent with loyal representation of
clients.
C. Advance Consent as Lawyer Overempowerment
The report on the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation ac-
knowledges that the advance-consent proposal runs contrary to cur-
153 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).
154 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2009-6 (2009).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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rent law on aggregate settlements158 but argues that the law ought to
be changed to facilitate comprehensive settlements of mass dis-
putes.15 9 The solution it offers is both creative and attractive, and suc-
cessive drafts have toned down some of its objectionable features.o60
The proposal builds in certain safeguards to increase the likelihood of
a fair settlement. Moreover, the advance-consent approach is trans-
parent and noncoercive, particularly in comparison to approaches
that mass tort lawyers currently employ to engineer comprehensive
deals. Given our conclusion that the Vioxx settlement's mandatory-
withdrawal provision was an impermissible approach to achieving an
otherwise attractive resolution of the dispute,' 61 we are tempted to
embrace any solution that offers to permit similar resolutions without
resorting to mandatory-withdrawal or similarly coercive devices. Ulti-
mately, however, the ALI proposal suffers from the same problem as
the Vioxx settlement: it shifts too much settlement power from the
claimants to their lawyers.
Our critique of the ALI proposal has two prongs: First, we raise
concerns about whether clients' advance consent to aggregate settle-
ments could ever be sufficiently authentic to justify the imposition on
158 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17 reporters' notes (Effect on Current Law) ("Sub-
sections (b)-(e) depart from the existing aggregate-settlement rule and would require
changes to the rules of professional responsibility in all jurisdictions."); see also id. § 3.18
reporters' notes (Effect on Current Law) (proposing language for a new rule effectuating
the proposal).
159 See id. § 3.17 cmt. b.
160 For example, the final proposal omits a troublingjudicial-bypass feature that would
have permitted plaintiffs' counsel to seek judicial approval to bind clients to a settlement
even if those clients had not given advance consent. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGRE-
GATE LITIGATION § 3.19, at 310-11 (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2007); see also Moore, supra note
131, at 399-401 (describing and critiquing the judicial-bypass proposal); 2009 Discussion of
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 122 (remarks of Dean Robert H. Klo-
noff) (explaining the decision to scrap the bypass provision). Moreover, the final proposal
reinstates a provision for limited judicial review to permit claimants to challenge unfair
settlements. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.18; see also 2009 Discussion of Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 122 (remarks of Dean Robert H. Klonoff) (explaining
the decision to permit claimants to challenge settlements for substantive unfairness). To
reduce the adhesion problem, the final proposal adds a requirement that lawyers offer
traditional representation as an alternative to advance-consent representation. See PRINcI-
PLEs, supra note 10, § 3.17(b) (4); see also 2009 Discussion of Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation, supra note 122 (remarks of Dean Robert H. Klonoff) (explaining the decision to
require the alternative of traditional representation "in response to concerns that essen-
tially the aggregate-settlement rule would simply become a nullity"). To address assorted
other concerns, the final proposal offers a list of factors relevant to the enforceability of
advance consent, including the sophistication of the claimants and whether a special
master reviewed the settlement terms. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(d). All of these
revisions make the proposal more palatable to those who, like us, are skeptical of moves
that empower lawyers to impose settlements on their clients. These improvements do not,
however, eliminate the two most fundamental problems with the proposal: the problem of
inauthentic consent and the problem of nonconsentable conflicts.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 41-117.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
clients' rights. Second, we contend that even if the problems of in-
authentic consent could be addressed, the advance-consent proposal
would place lawyers in a fundamentally untenable position. In any
dispute that raises serious allocation questions, the client-client con-
flicts of a yet-to-be-negotiated aggregate settlement are nonconsent-
able because they place the lawyer in the position of adjudicating
clients' claims vis-A-vis each other.
Both prongs concern problems of lawyer overempowerment-
giving lawyers the power to decide whether, when, and on what terms
to settle and the power to allocate settlement funds among clients
with conflicting interests. We should emphasize that this is our char-
acterization, not that of the ALL. The ALI proposal strives mightily to
insist that it empowers clients, not lawyers. The black letter of the
advance-consent provision emphasizes that settlement approval de-
pends on a supermajority vote of the claimants rather than on the
lawyer's determination: "The power to approve a settlement offer
must at all times rest with the claimants collectively and may under no
circumstances be assigned to claimants' counsel."162 Claimants in
mass litigation, however, infrequently reject settlements negotiated by
their lawyers. Accordingly, mass settlements negotiated by plaintiffs'
counsel will nearly always garner the approval of a sufficient
supermajority. If the dynamics of lawyer-client relationships in mass
litigation virtually guarantee supermajority approval, the notion that
the power to accept lies with the collective clients rather than with
counsel is illusory. More fundamentally, it is a mistake to equate a
minority veto-power over the collective settlement with the authority
of individual clients over their own claims.
The drafters of the ALI proposal acknowledged concerns that the
proposal "would give too much authority to lawyers representing mul-
tiple clients."163 They considered, but ultimately did not adopt, an
alternative approach involving the creation of an entity to pursue set-
tlement on behalf of multiple claimants.164 As the draft advanced, the
Reporter recognized the objection that the proposal "allowed too
162 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10 § 3.17(b) (1); see also Kerrie M. Brophy, Consent Waivers in
Non-Class Aggregate Settlements: Respecting Risk Preference in a Transactional Adjudication Mode4
22 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcs 677, 682 (2009) (accepting the ALI's assertion that its proposal, by
allowing claimants to vote on settlements, preserves claimants' power over the settlement
rather than handing that power to attorneys).
163 Samuel Issacharoff, Reporter's Memorandum, in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AGGREGATE
LrIGATION xiii, xiv (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2008).
164 Id.:
One concept that has been suggested and that is attractive to us is to au-
thorize the creation of an entity to which claims could be assigned and that
would have the authority to approve a settlement. Such an approach would
create an intermediary entity that would serve to protect private interests
without overly concentrating authority in the hands of plaintiffs' counsel.
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much authority to lawyers in both creating the ex ante agreement and
structuring the distribution of benefits from the settlement"'6 5 and
observed that the revised proposal "should accommodate some, but
certainly not all, of the objections."166 While the proposal became
more protective of client interests, its fundamental problems still
remain.
1. The Problem of Inauthentic Consent
Some of the problems with the ALI proposal echo the most basic
concerns about the Vioxx settlement. The ethical concerns about the
Vioxx settlement largely boil down to this: when claimants consented
to the settlement, their consent was inauthentic because they could
not rely on independent advice from counsel and because the pros-
pect of losing their lawyer left them with no real choice. For informed
consent to be authentic, the client must understand the choice and it
must be noncoercive. The ALI advance-consent proposal raises simi-
lar concerns about the authenticity of client consent. Rather than
eliminating the problem of informed consent, the proposal frontloads
the problem. It raises questions about whether clients, at the time
they sign retainer agreements, can understand the implications of
waiving their control over the settlement.1 67 There is reason to sus-
pect that, if the ALI proposal became law, virtually every mass tort
lawyer would include boilerplate advance-consent language in the re-
tainer agreement and virtually every client would sign it. Would cli-
ents understand what they are signing? Even if they did, would they
have any realistic alternative?
On the question of comprehension, much depends on the level
of client sophistication. 168 Clients who are not experienced users of
legal services are unlikely to base their advance consent on genuine
understanding of the trade-offs. Clients often sign whatever retainer
agreement the lawyer gives them; the fact that a client signed the law-
yer's standard retainer agreement would offer little reason to be confi-
dent that the client knowingly gave up the right to decide whether to
accept a settlement offer.
The ALI proposal tries to address the sophistication concern. It
requires that the advance-consent agreement be "fair and reasonable
165 Samuel Issacharoff, Reporter's Memorandum, in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION xiii, xiv (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
166 Id. at xv.
167 See Moore, supra note 131, at 419-20.
168 Client sophistication figures prominently in analysis of consent to conflicts of inter-
est. See, e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2001-2 (2001) ("To be sure,
sophisticated corporate and institutional clients can consent to conflicts which might be
non-consentable in cases involving unsophisticated lay clients who are not represented by
independent counsel in connection with the consent.").
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from a procedural standpoint" and offers a list of factors including the
"timing of the agreement, the sophistication of the claimants, the in-
formation disclosed to the claimants, whether the terms of the settle-
ment were reviewed by a neutral or special master[,] ... whether the
claimants have some prior common relationship, and whether the
claims of the claimants are similar."169 If the proposal were limited to
cases involving sophisticated claimants and virtually identical claims,
most of our objections would disappear. In the mass tort context,
however, the ALI's suggested factors play out differently. Mass tort
plaintiffs, on the whole, are probably not any more sophisticated than
the general population. Mass tort claimants rarely have a prior com-
mon relationship, at least in the products-liability context. Their
claims involve individual issues that present serious allocation
problems in an aggregate settlement. A mass tort lawyer seeking to
use the ALI advance-consent approach, however, could easily satisfy
the remaining factors by disclosing the advance-consent agreement
and by having the settlement reviewed by a special master. Unless
courts would be willing to strike down such agreements despite the
powerful inertia of mass settlements presented as faits accomplis, the
ALI proposal, if adopted, would likely result in the enforcement of
settlements despite the inauthentic consent of unsophisticated clients.
Certainly, as the ALI Aggregate Litigation Reporters empha-
size, 170 we permit people to waive all kinds of rights in our legal sys-
tem. For example, the right to a lawyer and the right to trial by jury
are waivable rights. Individuals may not, however, waive other rights,
such as the right to recover in a medical malpractice claim against a
physician or the right to sue for products liability. 171 Part of what dif-
ferentiates these two types of rights is that once the permissibility of
waiver is established in the latter, the market will uniformly require
such waivers, thereby rendering their voluntariness artificial. Simi-
larly, if lawyers could obtain advance settlement consent in mass torts,
the market for plaintiffs' lawyers in such cases might end up providing
only one option. The question is not whether a plaintiff could intelli-
gently waive such a right. Rather, the question is whether such waivers
would result in a legal system that de facto eliminated the possibility of
legal representation in mass tort cases that permitted a person to hold
169 PIuNCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(d).
170 Id. § 3.17 cmt. b ("Waivers of important rights are valid in a variety of areas, includ-
ing the most cherished of constitutional rights. Subsection (b) rejects the view that indi-
vidual decisionmaking over the settlement of a claim is so critical that it cannot be subject
to a contractual waiver in favor of decisionmaking governed by substantial-majority vote.");
see also id. § 3.17 reporters' notes (naming fundamental rights that claimants can waive).
171 Responding to the argument that clients should be permitted to waive their right
to reject a settlement because other important rights may be waived, Nancy Moore points
to numerous ways in which the law governing lawyers appropriately refuses to honor client
preferences. Moore, supra note 131, at 416-18.
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onto her right to determine whether to settle. Given the advantages,
from the perspective of mass plaintiffs' lawyers, of being able to nego-
tiate binding comprehensive settlements, would any talented lawyers
continue to offer their services without expecting advance consent to
settlement? If not, then clients who gave advance consent would be
doing so as an alternative to having no lawyer at all; it would be a
contract of adhesion. 7 2 To the extent that legal representation is
more like medical care than like hang gliding, the compromise of vol-
untariness built into such a waiver (in a uniformly waiver-requiring
market) is troubling as a matter of policy and principle.
The ALI proposal addresses the adhesion concern by requiring
that lawyers offer to represent claimants regardless of whether the cli-
ents agree to give advance settlement consent:
Before claimants enter into the agreement, their lawyer or group of
lawyers must explain to all claimants that the mechanism [of in-
formed consent under the traditional aggregate settlement rule] is
available as an alternative means of settling an aggregate lawsuit
under this Section. A lawyer or group of lawyers may not terminate
an existing relationship solely because the claimant declines to
enter into an [advance-consent agreement], and the lawyer must so
inform the client.' 73
This requirement goes some distance toward solving the problem of
lack of alternatives. In the end, however, the concern about market
alternatives is inseparable from the concern about client sophistica-
tion. If lawyers who represent mass tort plaintiffs recommend that
their clients sign the retainer agreement with the advance-consent
provision, expecting any clients to refuse is probably unrealistic. What
client would choose to hire a lawyer on terms that the lawyer says,
from the outset, are disadvantageous?
Because most mass tort plaintiffs are unsophisticated consumers
of legal services and because the nature of mass tort practice makes it
likely that lawyers overwhelmingly would prefer to obtain their clients'
advance consent to settlement, there are serious concerns about
whether client consent under the ALI proposal could ever be reliably
authentic.
172 See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1222-38 (1983) (explaining that the enforceability of contracts of
adhesion hinges on the allocation of power between commercial organizations and indi-
viduals and that enforcing boilerplate terms infringes on the freedom of the adhering
party).
173 PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 3.17(b) (4).
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2. The Problem of Nonconsentable Conflicts
Doubtful as we are about the prospects of authentic client con-
sent under the ALI proposal, the proposal is subject to an even more
fundamental problem. Even if the problems of sophistication and ad-
hesion could be overcome, advance consent should not be permitted
because the conflicts inherent in most aggregate settlements are non-
consentable in advance. In other words, assuming a sophisticated cli-
ent who fully understands the advance-consent mechanism, whose
lawyer provides full disclosure of its advantages and disadvantages,
and who has realistic alternatives, the client should not be permitted
to waive in advance the right to accept or reject a settlement.
To explain why the conflicts inherent in most aggregate settle-
ments should be nonconsentable in advance, we will consider the
problem in four steps: first, consentability of conflicts of interest in
general; second, consentability of conflicts in aggregate settlements;
third, advance consent to conflicts of interest in general; and fourth,
advance consent to conflicts in aggregate settlements. Looking at the
question of advance consent to the conflicts in aggregate settlements,
we will show that cases in which such advance consent should be per-
missible are likely to be quite rare.
Most conflicts of interest may be waived. Rule 1.7(b) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that notwithstanding a
conflict of interest, a lawyer generally may represent a client if the
client gives informed consent in writing. Some conflicts, however, are
nonconsentable.17 4 Client consent to a concurrent conflict of interest
is permissible only if "the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client."17 5 Significantly, consent is not permitted if the repre-
sentation involves "the assertion of a claim by one client against an-
other client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation."17 6
Like most other conflicts of interest, the conflicts involved in ag-
gregate settlements ordinarily may be waived. Indeed, the disclosure
and consent requirements of Rule 1.8(g)-the aggregate settlement
rule-are best understood as a specialized application of informed
consent to conflicts of interest.1 77 Although aggregate settlements
raise a host of client-client and lawyer-client conflicts of interest, in
most cases, the interests of clients are well served by a lawyer who rep-
174 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.7 cmt. 14 (2010) ("Ordinarily, clients
may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However,. . . some conflicts are
nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement
or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.").
175 Id. at R. 1.7(b) (1).
176 Id. at R. 1.7(b) (3).
177 See Erichson, supra note 125, at 1795-96.
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resents their interests collectively in the negotiation of an aggregate
settlement. By offering clients the benefits of leverage and economies
of scale, collective representation offers the only practical way for
plaintiffs in mass litigation to litigate on a level field against a defen-
dant who invests in the litigation based on the aggregate stakes. Not
only does collective representation improve the quality of plaintiffs'
litigation position, but in negotiating a settlement, a lawyer who repre-
sents a significant inventory of claimants generally has greater lever-
age than a lawyer who does not. Because of the benefits of Collective
representation and settlement, the conflicts involved in aggregate set-
tlements generally should be consentable. The nature of the cli-
ent-client and lawyer-client conflicts depends on the particular
litigation and the terms of the proposed settlement, but those con-
flicts may be explained to clients in accordance with the disclosure
requirements of the aggregate settlement rule. Thus, clients may give
their informed consent to the lawyer's multiple representation in
making an aggregate settlement, notwithstanding the conflicts of
interest.
When we turn to advance consent, things get trickier. It is one
thing to ask a client to consent to a known conflict of interest; it is
quite another to ask a client to consent to an unknown conflict that
may arise in the future. Advance-consent problems often arise in the
corporate setting.1 78 When a corporate client seeks to retain a law
firm for a new matter, the law firm may worry that representing the
client would render the firm incapable of taking on other matters in
the future because of conflicts of interest. If the law firm is large and
the prospective client is large, the risk of future conflicts of interest is
substantial. Understandably, some law firms in this situation seek as-
surances that the representation will not prohibit them from taking
on new work in the future. By asking the new client to consent in
advance to potential conflicts of interest, these firms hope to protect
future opportunities.
Whether such advance consent is permissible depends largely on
two things: the clarity of the anticipated conflict and the sophistica-
tion of the client. Comment 22 to Rule 1.7 explains the general stan-
dard for evaluating " [w] hether a lawyer may properly request a client
to waive conflicts that might arise in the future":
178 Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Proft Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005); Rich-
ard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 289, 308-11 (2000)
(suggesting that the ABA's rules on advance consent are unclear); see also Alice E. Brown,
Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest: Are the ABA Formal Ethics Opinions Advanced Enough
Themselves, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 567, 575-76 (2006); Michael J. DiLernia, Advance
Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large Law Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL Enics 97, 122-26
(2009).
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The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the ex-
tent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks
that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation
of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual
and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those represen-
tations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requi-
site understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a
particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar,
then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type
of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the con-
sent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely
that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On
the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal ser-
vices involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a
conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, partic-
ularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other coun-
sel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts
unrelated to the subject of the representation.17 9
Authorities take various approaches when considering the enforce-
ability of advance-conflict waivers, but they uniformly call for caution
when dealing with unsophisticated clients and difficult-to-foresee fu-
ture conflicts.
Applying these ideas to the context of the ALI proposal, aggre-
gate settlements appear poorly suited for advance consent to conflicts.
Not only are plaintiffs in mass litigation less sophisticated on the
whole than the typical corporate client, but the conflicts in aggregate
settlements are devilishly hard to describe before the settlement terms
exist. The terms and conditions of mass settlements vary widely and
raise too many different sorts of conflicts, both client-client and law-
yer-client. In other words, even if all clients had the sophistication to
understand the idea of advance consent to aggregate settlement,
whether such consent can ever suffice is questionable given that the
conflicts inherent in an aggregate settlement cannot be accurately
perceived until the contours of the settlement are known. A recent
New York City Bar ethics opinion emphasizes the near impossibility of
meaningful advance consent to an aggregate settlement:
[B]ecause of the dynamics of litigation and the settlement process,
"informed consent" to an advance waiver is virtually a contradiction
in terms. Comment 22 to Rule 1.7 states that "[t] he effectiveness of
advance waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the
client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver en-
tails." In most cases, at the outset of an engagement, and indeed at
179 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.7 cmt. 22; see also D.C. Bar, Op. 309 (2001)
("[T]he less specific the circumstances considered by the client and the less sophisticated
the client, the less likely that an advance waiver will be valid.").
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any point prior to an actual settlement negotiation, it may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to possess, and therefore dis-
close, enough information to enable the client to understand the
risks of waiving the right to approve a settlement following disclo-
sure of all material facts and terms. 80
Whether client consent can be "informed" at a point in the process
when so much remains to be seen is questionable.
Advance consent may be appropriate for some cases, but those
cases will be rare. Tax Authority'l8 provides a nice illustration of a sce-
nario where advance settlement consent could be permissible without
undue encroachment on client prerogatives.18 2 Recall that in Tax Au-
thority, the plaintiffs were owners of tax-preparation businesses, pre-
sumably relatively sophisticated legal consumers who could
understand the implications of waiving individual control over the set-
tlement decision. The retainer agreement they signed was apparently
designed for them, as it established voting rights and fee responsibili-
ties structured in accordance with the claims that they had under the
franchise agreement. It appears that the franchisees asserted identical
claims against their franchisor. Most important, the case did not ap-
pear to raise any serious allocation issues-the relative value of the
franchisees' claims was in proportion to their share of the "RAL re-
serve."183 Under the circumstances of the Tax Authority case, a lawyer
could explain at the outset the conflicts of interest that could arise in
the context of a future settlement offer, and the clients would proba-
bly have understood the nature of those conflicts. Because the claims
did not raise serious allocation problems, the lawyer would not be in
the position of judging the relative worth of his clients' claims.
This contrasts starkly with mass tort litigation. First, unlike the
franchisees in Tax Authority, the typical mass tort plaintiff is not a par-
ticularly sophisticated consumer of legal services, is unlikely to obtain
independent legal advice about whether to waive settlement control,
and is unlikely to understand the implications of the choice. The
more fundamental problem, however, concerns allocation. Mass tort
cases involving personal injury or wrongful death (or, for that matter,
any litigation in which the claims vary in strength or in which damages
180 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2009-6 (2009).
181 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006). For a discussion of Tax Authority, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 147-52.
182 The Reporters for the ALI project highlighted Tax Authority in support of their
proposal. See, e.g., 2008 Discussion of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note
122 (remarks of Professor Samuel Issacharoff) (laying out the facts of Tax Authority to
introduce the advance-consent proposal and calling it "the case that for us sets the stage
most clearly"). The terms of the ALI proposal, however, are not limited to cases like Tax
Authority in which the claimants are businesses and the settlement involves no serious allo-
cation problems.
183 Tax Authority, 898 A.2d at 515.
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are subjective or contingent) do not lend themselves to simple formu-
las for dividing settlement proceeds. Take, for example, a mass tort
involving personal-injury claims based on product liability. The value
of an individual claim depends in part on the amount of damages the
plaintiff would be entitled to if the plaintiff were to prevail at trial.
Items such as medical expenses, lost income, and pain and suffering
thus figure into the settlement value of a particular plaintiffs claim.
The value also depends on the likelihood that the particular plaintiff
would prevail at trial. Thus, items such as proof of exposure, length of
exposure, and alternative risk factors affect the settlement value. In
addition to all of these details that relate to the merits of the claim,
certain details not related to the merits also figure into the plaintiffs
prospects at trial, such as whether the plaintiff is a sympathetic victim
and whether the jurisdiction is known for large verdicts on damages.
A defendant deciding how much to pay to obtain the particular plain-
tiffs release would be interested in all of these factors. Similarly, a
rational plaintiff would consider these factors in weighing whether to
give up the right to go to trial in exchange for a particular amount of
compensation.
When an aggregate settlement resolves mass tort claims on a
wholesale basis, the negotiations rarely account for all of the factors
that might come into play when evaluating individual claims. None-
theless, lawyers often establish a matrix of settlement values to take
into account the most salient factors that can be efficiently compared
across claimants. Depending on the nature of the claims, the matrix
may include disease category, severity of injury, age, risk factors,
length of exposure, proof, and other items relevant to determining
how much of the settlement each claimant will receive. Whatever the
approach used, in any aggregate settlement that includes monetary
compensation, the settlement funds must somehow be allocated
among the claimants.
Several approaches to allocation are possible. Plaintiffs' lawyers
may negotiate the allocation with the defendants. Plaintiffs' lawyers
may determine the allocation themselves. Plaintiffs' lawyers may dele-
gate the allocation process to a special master. What plaintiffs' lawyers
cannot do is avoid the necessity of allocation. Even the decision to
give each plaintiff an identical settlement amount is an allocative deci-
sion (and a questionable one except in cases where the claims are
either uniform or very small). 184
When a lawyer for multiple claimants negotiates an aggregate set-
tlement, the conflicts of interest involved in allocating settlement
184 See Erichson, supra note 125, at 1800.
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funds can be severe.185 Indeed, in settlements where the allocation
occurs after a total fund has been negotiated, the conflicts are those of
a zero-sum game. But this situation does not necessarily make the
conflicts nonconsentable. As long as the client has the right to accept
or reject the settlement after learning of the allocation and the con-
flicts it entailed, the situation falls within the scope of consentable
conflicts that the conflict rules in general and the aggregate settle-
ment rule in particular permit. The lawyer represented the clients in
the negotiation of the settlement. Each client may choose whether to
accept the settlement and, in so doing, to consent to the conflicts of
interest in the deal.
If the lawyer obtained the clients' advance consent to be bound
by an aggregate settlement, however, the story changes. Even if the
lawyer is able to represent all of her clients together when negotiating
with the defendant over the size of the overall settlement, an entirely
different sort of problem arises when the lawyer turns to the question
of how much each client is entitled to receive relative to her other
clients. On this issue, the lawyer finds herself in the untenable posi-
tion of adjudicating claims between her clients.
Arguably, this is simply a kind of arbitration agreement. On this
theory, clients who give advance consent to be bound by an aggregate
settlement are appointing their lawyer to arbitrate the conflicting in-
terests among the client group in the context of negotiating and con-
summating the aggregate settlement. The law enforces arbitration
agreements in a wide variety of settings, so why not this one? The
problem is that, at least as envisioned by the ALI proposal (and in
every one of the cases that has taken up the issue), the clients do not
think they are hiring an arbitrator. They think they are hiring a law-
yer to represent them in a lawsuit against the defendant. Advance
settlement consent, in the ALI proposal, does not presuppose that the
lawyer will be functioning in an adjudicative rather than a representa-
tive relationship. Rather, the lawyer is understood to be putting her-
self forward for the purposes of an otherwise standard lawyer-client
relationship in which she is retained to advance the client's interest
whether by litigation or negotiation.
We have argued that the advance-consent proposal presents a cli-
ent-client conflict of interest that is nonconsentable. At one level,
our criticism might appear too nuanced. We recognize that the aggre-
gate settlement rule permits a lawyer to represent multiple clients in a
settlement so long as clients retain the power of back-end consent to
the settlement terms. In other words, we accept that a lawyer may
negotiate a settlement for multiple clients, notwithstanding the inher-
185 See Moore, supra note 131, at 408-09 (explaining that financial incentives and spe-
cial relationships with certain clients may bias a lawyer's decision regarding allocation).
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ent conflicts of interest, if clients individually agree to the terms. But
the inability of clients to reject the settlement agreement, in our view,
creates a nonconsentable client-client conflict. How can the client's
approval make such a difference?
The answer is that there is a world of difference between a lawyer
creating an option for each of multiple clients to release his or her claim
as part of an aggregate settlement and a lawyer consummating the release
of these claims. To simplify, imagine a settlement fund of $200 mil-
lion for three hundred clients suing an asbestos defendant-one hun-
dred mesothelioma claimants and two hundred exposure-only
claimants. Simplify further and imagine a $2 million fund for three
clients of lawyer L-client X with mesothelioma and clients Y and Z
who are exposure-only claimants. Although the fixed size of the fund
entails an obvious conflict of interest in the allocation of the settle-
ment, the conflict is consentable under the aggregate settlement rule
as long as X, Y, and Z each retain the right to decide whether to settle.
If the lawyer negotiates a deal of $1.8 million for X, $100,000 for Y,
and $100,000 for Z, then X, Y, and Z each can decide whether to ac-
cept the settlement after learning its terms.
By contrast, suppose L's retainer agreement with each of X, Y,
and Z states that L may execute a settlement agreement for the client
on whatever terms L deems acceptable, and suppose L executes the
settlement agreements on such terms. The problem here is not that
the result is bad or that L is untrustworthy. The problem is that it is
incoherent to suppose that L, when she executes these releases, is act-
ing as an agent of X and acting as an agent of Y and acting as an agent
of Z. Because L is one lawyer and because she is dealing with a fixed
settlement sum, it is not cogent to understand this as X's act of re-
lease, Y's act of release, and Z's act of release, each through the agent
L. It is simply L's act of allocation among them.
Does a vote of the client group change anything? It adds a safe-
guard against egregiously inadequate settlements, but fundamentally,
voting does not alter the fact that the lawyer cannot coherently be
representing each of the clients in the allocation process if those cli-
ents may be bound over their objection. In the XYZ client group,
ratification by a two-thirds majority would not make it the case that
the dissenting client accepted the settlement through his lawyer. In-
deed, the example shows how easily a lawyer can manipulate
supermajority votes in the mass tort context. By overvaluing Ys and
Z's claims and undervaluing X's claim, L can virtually assure a positive
vote. The same, of course, can be done in settlements of hundreds or
thousands of claimants.
The client-client conflict is nonconsentable without back-end ap-
proval not because (or at least, not only because) the lawyer's divided
[Vol. 96:265310
CONSENT VERSUS CLOSURE
loyalties make her untrustworthy. The client-client conflict is non-
consentable because the divided loyalties undermine the possibility
that her putative release of a client's claim in aggregate settlement
should count as the client's release. What the back-end approval does
is not simply to cleanse an otherwise suspicious deal. It preemptively
avoids the agency problem that divided loyalties present. The client
who gives back-end informed consent to an aggregate settlement is
releasing the claim herself, not through her lawyer. Without back-end
consent, the client is merely losing her claim (and gaining some
money), not releasing it.
We can envision two ways that an advance settlement consent
mechanism might avoid running afoul of fundamental principles.
Unfortunately, neither way holds much appeal as a broad-based solu-
tion to the problem of finding closure in mass tort litigation. First,
the mechanism could be limited to sophisticated clients with claims
that present no serious allocation problems-the Tax Authority scena-
rio.186 In cases that fit this description, advance consent is not particu-
larly problematic. Such a limitation, however, would render the
mechanism useless in the vast majority of mass litigation. Second, the
mechanism could explicitly place the lawyer in the role of arbitrator,
avoiding any pretense of creating a lawyer-client relationship. But
this mechanism would accomplish little. Claimants in mass tort litiga-
tion seek out lawyers to represent them in pursuing their claims. At
the outset, neither claimants nor lawyers know what will happen in
any claimant's case. From the perspective of the initial moment when
the lawyer is hired, the case could go to trial, it could be dismissed, it
could settle individually, it could settle as part of a nonclass aggregate
settlement, or it could get swept up into a class action. The lawyer has
leverage to negotiate a settlement only because she can take cases to
trial if necessary. The lawyer may wish to have the client's advance
consent in the event the lawyer negotiates a nonclass aggregate settle-
ment, but in the end, the lawyer's leverage to obtain a favorable settle-
ment depends upon the lawyer's access to the full range of litigation
options.
IV
CONSENT AND CLOSURE
Part I set out the problem of obtaining closure in mass tort settle-
ments, Part II argued that the leading real-world example for solving
that problem is unacceptable as a model, and Part III argued that the
best-conceived legal-reform solution to those problems is similarly un-
acceptable. Our critics will object that we are letting an obsessive con-
186 See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
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cern with consent stand in the way of win-win solutions, that we are
letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.18 7
This understandable line of objection merges together two re-
lated challenges: (a) Is a rigorous focus on client consent really justifi-
able? (b) Given that the ALI's advance-consent proposal would secure
closure and offers a solution that is, in most respects, satisfactory, is it
not the right normative decision to embrace that proposal and simply
tolerate whatever concerns remain regarding consent? Both of these
challenges merit responses.
A. The Importance of Consent
First, it may well be true that most plaintiffs would choose a sub-
stantial economic recovery in a reasonable period of time over strict
compliance with informed-consent requirements, and in this sense,
focusing on consent may seem impractical and paternalistic. 88 But
tort law is not simply a device for transferring wealth, and good law-
yers are not simply maximizers of average payout. As one of us has
argued in prior work, tort law provides individuals with an avenue of
civil recourse against those who have committed legal wrongs against
them.18 9 It does so by empowering individuals with a right of action
against tortfeasors. When the tort system is functioning well, compen-
sation for injured parties can be an extremely important byproduct,
but the claim tort law provides against the tortfeasor is not precisely a
means to that end. The claim is something that a plaintiff has if and
only if she was tortiously injured, and its point is the empowerment to
187 Cf FRANCOIs VOLTAIRE, LA B9GUEULE, CONTE MORAL (Geneva 1772) ("[L]e mieux
est l'ennemi du bien.").
188 See NAGAREDA, supra note 9, at xx:
Rather than attempt to legitimize the peace by reference to claimant auton-
omy, the law instead should look to how other regimes of administration
have garnered legitimacy: by using institutional structure to align the inter-
ests of the administrators with those of the people whom they are supposed
to serve, not by empowering affected persons to opt out.
189 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
738-41 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse] (developing the civil recourse theory
of tort law and arguing for its superiority over the corrective justice theory); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 623, 627-36 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (analyzing the
concept of right of action within tort law in terms of civil recourse theory); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1, 70-88 (1998)
[hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse] (introducing the civil recourse theory
of tort law); see alsoJohn C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 559-611 (2005) (explaining the
historical roots of the civil recourse theory of tort law and indicating its constitutional
status). John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have jointly elaborated the civil recourse
theory in several subsequent works, most recently JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C.
ZIPuRsKY, THE OxFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAw: TORTS 47-62 (2010); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REv. 917 (2010).
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seek redress. Whether to develop or use that claim at all is, of course,
the individual's choice; most people who are the victims of tortious
wrongdoing simply choose not to sue. When a client has chosen to
sue, the fact that she has employed a lawyer to do so on her behalf
does not mean that the claim is no longer hers. To lose the right to
decide whether to settle one's claim, and on what terms, is to lose
control of that claim in a very real sense. The right to make such
decisions generally does include the right to empower someone act-
ing as a fiduciary to make that decision on one's behalf, and in this
sense, advance consent might seem to be part of the client's right
rather than antithetical to it. But unless and until we have reason to
believe that client will actually understand what the delegation of that
decision-making power means, and will have a realistic opportunity of
declining to delegate it, checking the advance-consent box is not a
delegation of the right as much as an unwitting forfeiture of it.
Perhaps class actions have habituated some legal thinkers into
abandoning the paradigm of individual client rights within aggregate
litigation. But cases involving nonclass aggregate litigation, like Vioxx
or those contemplated by the AL1 proposal, differ fundamentally from
class actions. Despite strong functional similarities in the ways lawyers
handle class actions and mass nonclass litigation, the formal differ-
ence still matters. Above all, it affects whether individual claims are
subsumed into the collective.o90 Injunctive class actions, limited-fund
class actions, and money-damages class actions for negative-value
claims represent the most significant examples of when the collective
claim overpowers individual claims.19' To take one example, an in-
junction-seeking class action of working-age members of a racial mi-
nority against the local factory for a silent policy of employment
discrimination involves individual civil rights, to be sure, but the claim
of any one member of the class does not stand alone, and the aggre-
gate quality of the legal action pushes strongly in the direction of col-
lective litigation and collective settlement. Similarly, a true limited-
fund class action deprives claimants of the right to control their indi-
vidual claims because, like bankruptcy, the situation demands collec-
tive treatment. Even in class actions that theoretically permit opt-outs,
economic imperatives may deprive claimants of control over their in-
dividual claims. Five million Con Edison customers with $4.00 claims
against the utility for fraudulent rate-setting have plausible assertions
that their individual rights were violated, but the individual claimants
190 For an analysis of claimants' varying relationships to the claimant group, distin-
guishing between "group-oriented individuals" and "individuals-within-the-collective," see
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FoREsr L.
REv. 1, 11-24 (2009).
191 Id.
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are unlikely to control the conditions under which their claims are
compromised.
All of these cases carry with them reasons why the individual's
claim is, in an important sense, subordinate to the group claim. In
the civil rights injunctive-class-action context, the class members are,
by virtue of being members of that class, the designated beneficiaries
of the conduct the court is being asked to compel of the defendant.
The class is not merely put together for power or convenience: just as
one state might seek an injunction against another state's pollution,
so a racial group may seek an injunction against a large employer's
discrimination. The Con Edison example is quite different; the indi-
vidual claim stands apart from other claims as a conceptual and legal
matter, but as a practical matter, it is notional as an individual claim
because no one would bother to go to the trouble of bringing a $4.00
claim, apart from a class. Apart from class actions, our legal system
treats these claims as nonexistent by virtue of being de minimis.
Claims like those asserted in the Vioxx litigation are quite differ-
ent from each of these paradigms. The relief sought is individual.
The obligation foisted upon the defendant pertains only to ex post
compensation to the individual plaintiff. The parties did not claim
and could not realistically claim a limited fund was at stake. Individ-
ual stakes were far from de minimis. The most important reasons for
thinking of individual claims as fundamentally dependent on their re-
lation to the group claim are inapposite. A package deal may make
claims more attractive to settle, and collective representation may be
the only way plaintiffs in mass litigation can litigate on an even field
with defendants. But the fact that membership in a group may en-
hance litigation prospects and settlement leverage does not alter the
fact that the plaintiff has a free-standing right of action against the
defendant.
A facially impressive argument for the advance-consent proposal
is that many clients would choose to delegate the power to settle if
they fully understood what that meant because it would increase the
likely value of their claim.' 9 2 As discussed above, when we effectively
categorize some form of lawyer-client transaction as nonconsentable
even with full informed consent, we are effectively frustrating a cli-
ent's wishes. In an article that has pushed the value of client choice
and client autonomy as a central theme, the insistence on noncon-
sentability has the air of paradox.
192 See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 162, at 688 ("Arguably, individual autonomy can be
enhanced by the implementation of ex-ante consent waivers. Allowing people to choose a
form of adjudication based on their preferences for risk enhances rather than diminishes
their control over the pursuit of legal recourse.").
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This argument merits closer examination. In essence, a mass tort
plaintiffs lawyer working under the ALI proposal is creating the legal
infrastructure for an entity-the aggregate of his clients-that owns
all the claims insofar as it has the power to settle all the claims simulta-
neously. He is trying to represent that entity as a unit while also repre-
senting each member in it. A client is essentially transferring his right
to a group (of which he is a part) in return for the right to vote as part
of the group and the right to a payout under a settlement reached by
the group. More precisely, he is signing up for an arrangement that
gives the lawyer an option to bring the group into existence for a vote
because the right to decide upon the claim stays with the client indi-
vidually unless the lawyer negotiates a settlement and brings the
group into existence for the vote, which the lawyer is legally entitled
to do (under this system). A rational, wealth-maximizing client might
want to become part of such a client group because doing so might be
a rational strategy for maximizing settlement payoff. It therefore may
seem that we are contradicting ourselves by insisting that the ALI pro-
posal undercuts clients' rights.
Despite appearances, there is no contradiction or paradox here.
Our insistence on attending closely to the individual's claim-his
right of redress-against the tortfeasor is hardly equivalent to a ge-
neric focus on individual choice or the value of individual wealth max-
imization. A right of action in tort is not an asset with respect to
which the individual is simply entitled to maximize its value. It is a
legal power to exact a certain remedy from a defendant through the
court system.193 Transferring the power to one's attorney or to a
group of the attorney's clients might be the most conducive to a valua-
ble settlement, even if the transfer occurs under circumstances where
the attorney could no longer act as one's agent; but rights of action in
tort are personal and exist only because the person herself was legally
wronged.194 Just because clients have the right to settle, discontinue,
assert, or simply not assert their right as they choose does not entail
the power to transfer the control connected with this right to some-
one who will not be acting as their agent. Similarly, the right to dele-
gate the power to make important decisions regarding their claims to
a lawyer acting as their agent does not entail the right to alienate the
claim in a transaction with a lawyer not acting as their agent. Individ-
uals with private rights of action in tort have a right to control their
claims and may have a desire for a system that will maximize the value
of their claims, but rights and desires are not the same. These individ-
uals have no right to a system that will maximize the value of their
claims. Insofar as tort law aims to secure an egalitarian framework, it
193 See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 189.
194 See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 189, at 4-5.
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does not do so by pushing for the highest payouts for tort victims.
Rather, it does so by telling each person that their duties not to mis-
treat others are general and extend to all and by telling all that the
right to redress a wrong done to them is theirs to use or not use as
they wish. Above all, it equalizes protection and power, not
resources.1 9 5
Although we are putting these points forward as general com-
ments about rights within tort law, three aspects of the mass tort con-
text deserve special attention. First, in circumstances like those giving
rise to the Vioxx litigation, considerations of plaintiff empowerment
are hardly mere theoretical abstractions. The problems giving rise to
the litigation in the first place felt to many of those who became plain-
tiffs like a quintessential erasure of the significance of individuals in
the face of a corporate megalith (Merck) 196 and a government agency
(FDA) that failed to protect them,197 turning instead into a bureau-
cratic megalith of its own. With staggering enthusiasm and resources
poured into marketing, Merck aggressively sold its product to young
and old, sick and healthy alike, regardless of whether they fit the pro-
file of those who really needed a COX-2 inhibitor.198 It did so by pro-
viding its sales force with a "Dodge Ball" memorandum explaining
how to dodge questions from physicians about the cardiovascular risks
of the drug.199 By creating a market of 20 million U.S. users,200 Merck
earned billions of dollars and, according to some experts' estimates,
ended up killing tens of thousands of people.201 Significant persons
within the FDA later told Congress that the FDA acquiesced to
Merck's hard stance against changing the "Warnings" section of the
drug's label, 202 even when both the FDA and Merck were fully aware
of data that suggested a possible fourfold increase in the risk of heart
attack or stroke for those taking the drug.203
195 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products
Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1919 (2010)
(explaining claimant empowerment as critical to the egalitarian aspect of products-liability
law).
196 Cf Burch, supra note 190, at 47-48 (describing the need of claimants in cases like
Vioxx to be recognized as individuals).
197 See Hearing, supra note 42 (statement of Bruce M. Psaty, M.D., Professor, Medicine
and Epidemiology, University of Washington, Cardiovascular Health Research Unit); Eric
J. Topol, Failing the Public Health-Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1707,
1708 (2004).
198 Cf McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 232-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(describing the aggressive marketing campaign by Merck).
199 Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning Signs: E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew
Vioxx's Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at Al.
200 Id.
201 See Hearing, supra note 42 (statement of Bruce M. Psaty, M.D., Professor, Medicine
and Epidemiology, University of Washington, Cardiovascular Health Research Unit).
202 See id.
203 SeeJfmi et al., supra note 47, at 2027.
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Our political system uses tort law in part to allow those who have
been victimized by the large and powerful to respond. 204 It empowers
the individual with a right.205 It is one thing for long waits and cum-
bersome litigation to frustrate this empowerment. It is another thing
for the individual to learn one day in the newspaper that his lawyer
has signed an agreement requiring the client to accept an unknown
amount or else lose the lawyer. Mass tort litigation is not the best
place to think that maximizing collective monetary recovery justifies
departing from the norm of treating clients as having rights.
Second, the disempowerment of individual clients is not simply a
channeling of client rights into higher financial payouts for clients
themselves. There is another part of the story. Someone other than
the client acquires an enormous amount of power-the lawyer. Client
disempowerment is also lawyer empowerment, and the empowerment
of the lawyer is not purely in service of a better deal for clients. In this
setting, the lawyer acquires more money than any of her clients.2 0 6
Given that members of the legal profession overwhelmingly are the
individuals proposing changes to the law of mass torts, we ought to be
especially distrustful of a plan of client disempowerment allegedly put
forward for welfarist reasons.
Third, we recognize that, ironically, concern about the misalloca-
tion of power is part of what has motivated advocates of the advance-
consent proposal. Scholars and lawyers worry that holdouts within the
plaintiff pool (and sometimes their lawyers) can be an obstacle to
comprehensive settlement. 207 If a defendant demands that a settle-
ment be all-or-nothing, each individual claimant holds veto power.208
Why should individuals have the power to spoil a fair outcome for
thousands of others, for a large drug company that serves many, and
for an already overburdened court system? From this vantage point,
concerns about the fair allocation of power seem to cut in favor of an
advance-consent proposal like that offered by the ALI. 209
Responding to this objection is difficult because it conflates two
quite different versions of the "holdout" story. If it simply reiterates
the point that social welfare would be enhanced if the putative right to
consent to one's settlement were not treated as categorical, and cate-
204 See Goldberg, supra note 189, at 607.
205 Cf THOMAs H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RusTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAw 9, 67, 207
(2001) (characterizing the role of tort law in permitting individuals to hold corporate
malefactors accountable).
206 Cf Berenson, supra note 2 ("Besides Merck, the biggest winner in the case may be
the plaintiffs' lawyers.").
207 See Silver & Baker, Mass Lawsuits, supra note 128, at 762.
208 See Erichson, The Trouble, supra note 74, at 1012-13.
209 Indeed, this is the position taken by the project's Reporter and Associate Reporter
in Issacharoff & Klonoff, supra note 8, at 1185.
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gorically within the claimant's discretion, we have already responded.
Taking rights seriously means giving them staying power even when
the general social welfare appears to point in the other direction.210
We shall have more to say about the alleged dilemma below.
However, another suggestion here requires careful examination:
the charge of extortion-the suggestion that those refusing to settle
their claims are obviously merely manipulative hold-outs, that these
claimaints must recognize proposed settlements as perfectly accept-
able and desirable and, by holding out, are simply trying to squeeze
more out of the defendant at the cost of everyone around them. If all
claimants rejecting a settlement offer fell into this category, then per-
mitting them to act on their purely manipulative intentions would be
preposterous. The argument might go that good faith exercises of the
right matter, not abusive or manipulative exercises. It would be naive
to deny that some allegedly reluctant claimants are like this, but we
find no reason to suppose that only a manipulative claimant would
reject the settlement agreement. Claimants have different risk toler-
ances, different litigation objectives, different satisficing levels, and
different evaluations of the strength of their own claims. Moreover,
settlements treat claimants differently, leaving some better compen-
sated than others. Claimants may place different values on certainty
and may differ in their evaluation of the certainty that settlement pro-
vides. On the facts of Vioxx, the claimants had very little sense of how
much money they would obtain from a settlement. There is good rea-
son to think that some of them genuinely wanted to take Merck to
trial rather than accept an utterly indefinite settlement.
B. The Putative Value of Closure
The second challenge our critics may raise is this: given that the
ALI advance-consent proposal would secure closure and offers a solu-
tion that is, in most respects, satisfactory, is it not the right normative
decision to embrace that proposal and simply tolerate concerns re-
garding consent?
The most important response to this challenge is that it begins
with an undefended and indefensible premise: virtual comprehensive-
ness is necessary in a mass tort settlement because closure is necessary.
It is true that the Vioxx settlement secured closure and that it was not
likely to have done so without rigid restrictions on plaintiffs' lawyers.
It is also true that the ALI advance-consent proposal is well designed
to achieve closure and that equally high levels of closure are unlikely
without the proposal (or something comparable). Additionally, clo-
210 See generally RONALD DwomaN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1978) (analyzing
the concept of rights as trumping over considerations of social welfare).
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sure is often regarded as desirable. Defendants like Merck want clo-
sure so they can rehabilitate their goodwill, reassure investors, control
uncertainty, and stop spending huge sums of money on litigation.
Plaintiffs' lawyers want closure so they can recoup the enormous front-
end capital expenditures required to finance mass tort litigation and
can turn to other litigation. Judges want closure to clear their dockets
and achieve resolution of the mass dispute.
The question is not, however, whether these participants want clo-
sure-of course they do. The question is whether closure, or a very
high level of comprehensiveness in settlement, is needed-whether,
from a social perspective, closure should be regarded as a sine qua
non for an acceptable settlement of mass tort claims. We see no rea-
son to suppose an affirmative answer to this question. Mass tort settle-
ments over the past several decades typically have not provided closure
of the sort that Merck obtained in Vioxx and that the ALI proposal
aims to secure. Yet, settlements have occurred, and this fact is not
surprising. Even without the absolute closure envisioned by the Vioxx
terms and the ALI proposal, a mass settlement can allow a defendant
to put the majority of litigation behind it, reduce litigation expenses,
and quantify the remaining risk. Even without whatever premium
may attach to a settlement that delivers comprehensive peace, a settle-
ment can provide sufficient compensation to persuade most plaintiffs
to release their claims. When one steps back to look at how the law-
yer-empowerment model took root-the arc from Amchem to fen-phen
to Vioxx to the ALI proposal 21 1-one sees a conflation of the desire for
closure and the need for closure, a merger of ideas that occurs even
more easily when one party takes the stance that it needs closure. If
one examines both what should, in theory, occur and what has, in
fact, occurred, the closure-is-necessary premise is easily refuted. 212
We are left, then, with the argument that even if closure is not
necessary, it is better than a piecemeal solution. Unless a settlement
binds nearly all the claimants, a substantial number of unresolved
claims will continue to go forward through discovery, motions, trials,
appeals, and possible individual or group settlements. A comprehen-
sive settlement, the argument goes, is the best option.
Though appealing, this argument begs the question in multiple
ways. One needs to establish independently that comprehensive set-
tlement is an option. One needs to say for whom comprehensive settle-
ment is the best option. And one needs to determine according to
whom comprehensive settlement is the best option. None of these
questions can be answered in a manner supportive of the ALI propo-
sal without simply assuming that an individual client's right to make
211 See supra text accompanying notes 13-33.
212 See Moore, supra note 131, at 403-05.
2011] 319
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
an authentic decision about whether to settle should, in the end, be
overridden. But that is the very point that must be established.
Finally, readers should not imagine that our willingness to take
claimants' decisional rights seriously derives from an inclination to
throw social welfare to the wind. The converse is more likely true: we
suspect that the ALI's willingness to throw claimants' decisional rights
to the wind derives from an overconfident view of what social welfare
demands. Any adequate evaluation of the comparative value of a com-
prehensive settlement must include broad considerations that schol-
ars have not even begun to address: Is the deterrent value of products-
liability law undermined when a company like Merck can take an epi-
sode like the Vioxx debacle in stride? Or, is the legitimacy of our legal
institutions in the eyes of the public undermined when a company
pays almost $5 billion for claims that have left only one out of eigh-
teen plaintiffs who went to trial with an unscathed jury verdict 213 and
have produced only three plaintiff victories out of almost fifty thou-
sand plaintiffs? Of the roughly $7 billion Merck will have spent on the
Vioxx litigation, approximately $3.5 billion will have been on attor-
neys' fees (including roughly $2 billion for defense litigation fees).214
Can a healthcare system that is hemorrhaging money afford to pay
billions of dollars for highly sophisticated lawyers to hash out deals
that end up paying them fifty cents on the dollar? And if Vioxx has
killed, as some have estimated, tens of thousands of people, should we
stomach a resolution that pays out modest amounts to victims and
their families while lawyers are empowered to take home hundreds of
millions of dollars?
We do not have answers to these questions, and our point in rais-
ing them is not to assert that, after all, the Vioxx settlement was a bad
outcome. But the articulation of the issues should give us pause.
There are innumerable reasons to question the public-welfare creden-
tials of a resolution such as the Vioxx settlement and those resolutions
that would be achieved if the ALI proposal were to become law.
CONCLUSION
Consent and closure turn out to be antipodes in the world of
mass tort settlements. Many lawyers and scholars, from those involved
in the Vioxx settlement to those who drafted the Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation, believe that the demand for comprehensive settle-
ments dictates a flexible approach toward consent. They have not
quite said that closure trumps consent; they have stopped short of say-
ing this because they have taken the position that the need for client
213 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
214 See Berenson, supra note 2.
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consent in settlement can be accommodated within a system in which
clients nominally consent to a deal or in which clients consent in ad-
vance to be bound by a collective decision. The advance-consent idea
for nonclass aggregate settlements purports to harmonize the need
for client consent with the need for closure. We have argued above
that the circle cannot be squared: consent and closure cannot, in the
end, be accommodated in the manner envisioned either by the Vioxx
deal or by the ALI proposal. If settlements of individual claims are to
retain legitimacy, it is closure that must give way, not consent.
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